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0 pointssemi-extrinsic10y ago0 comments

The problem is basically how the centralized validation is supposed to work. For e.g. the Linux kernel, it's doable because all code in the kernel must (almost by definition) interact with some other part of the kernel. Thus someone else than the code owner, being responsible for those other parts of the kernel, can be tasked with signing off on the new code being good and non-malicious.

But for NPM or PyPI, where anyone can upload anything, how's that supposed to work? It's perfectly fine for someone to put a package called "removeallfiles" on PyPI which executes "sudo rm -rf /". This isn't (by itself) malicious code. The same code, but obfuscated and put in the package name "isarray", is perhaps obviously malicious. But what about something in the middle, e.g. some form of practical joke package? What central authority decides what is allowed and what is not on PyPI?

Signing is a tangential issue. As long as you're trusting the dev who uploaded the code, what difference does it make whether they used password or public key auth (effectively)?

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raesene310y ago

Well if there's no central validation, that leaves all individual users to validate packages before use (which is a huge amount of work)...

The problem is that companies are using these packages as though they are trusted (i.e. not validating them when using them), and that's part of the value proposition in the first place (i.e. it's easier to use this package than write it myself), but it's missing the cost of validation.

On signing I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing. I'm referring to developers cryptographically signing packages before pushing to the repository, with a key that the end-user can validate. the idea is to protect against a comrpomise of the repository. There's a good discussion of the risks and potential solutions on The update framework's site (https://theupdateframework.github.io/)

semi-extrinsicOP10y ago

I completely agree on the first two paragraphs.

Wrt. signing: I'm assuming we are talking about PyPI and NPM here. Also I'm assuming the major threat vector for a repository compromise is that (some of) the dev's accounts on some other services (most likely email) are somehow compromised. In which case it's down to that dev's OPSEC practices whether the repository can be compromised using the data from $OTHER_SERVICE. If the dev has poor OPSEC and would reuse the password for multiple accounts in a user/pass repo auth scenario, it's reasonable that this person would also have emailed themself the keys for signing packages, e.g. for transferring to another location behind a firewall. In either case, you're down to trusting the dev's OPSEC.

IMO, the threat models for other kinds of compromises which signing protects against are much more far fetched. AFAICT neither PyPI nor NPM use third-party mirrors, which basically leaves MitM attacks. If an attacker is capable of successfully MitM-ing the connections you make to PyPI/NPM over https, you have much bigger problems.

Or am I missing your point here?

raesene310y ago

Ah yes, so the threat model for developer signing is compromise of the repository. So here we're looking at the OpSec of the repository owner (e.g. PyPI, npm, Rubygems etc), and also the risk of deliberate compromise by the repo. owner (for example where a state with authority over the repository compels them to modify a package)

In terms of compromise there's already been the attack on Rubygems in 2013, but in general the thought here is that these repositories are extremely tempting targets for well-funded attackers. A compromise of npm for example would give an attacker direct access to a very wide range of targets.

Combine this with the very limited resources of the repository owners (most are free resources, likely constraining the money available for defence) and you get a realistic risk of attack, which is mitigated by an appropriate use of signing by the developer.

Docker hub has deployed an implementation of the Update Framework to address this, although the interesting point now is whether people actually use it as it's not compulsory...

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse

0 pointssemi-extrinsic10y ago0 comments

Signing is a tangential issue. As long as you're trusting the dev who uploaded the code, what difference does it make whether they used password or public key auth (effectively)?

0 comments

raesene310y ago

Well if there's no central validation, that leaves all individual users to validate packages before use (which is a huge amount of work)...

semi-extrinsicOP10y ago

I completely agree on the first two paragraphs.

Or am I missing your point here?

raesene310y ago

Docker hub has deployed an implementation of the Update Framework to address this, although the interesting point now is whether people actually use it as it's not compulsory...

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse