There are several ways of defining real numbers, and one of them is the axiomatic definition. Real numbers are defined by a list of axioms they must satisfy. These would include, among others:
(1) If x and y are reals, then x + y = y + x. (2) If S is a nonempty subset of reals with an upper bound, then S has a least upper bound.
There is a crucial difference between these two. In (1) the variables x and y only quantify over reals, but in (2) the variable S quantifies over subsets of reals. We say that (1) is a first-order axiom and (2) is a second-order axiom. Actually, among all of the axioms of real numbers, (2) is the only one that is second-order. Therefore, it is natural to ask: can we rid of it?
No, we cannot. Löwenheim-Skolem theorem says that if we only have first-order axioms, then it is impossible to distinguish between countable and uncountable sets - even if we have an infinite number of first-order axioms. In particular, this means that if we try to define real numbers using only first-order axioms, then the definition cannot even capture the basic fact that there is an uncountable number of reals.
From here on, there are two roads you could take. If you're like me, then you just accept that real numbers cannot be defined using first-order axioms. By my standards, any definition that only uses first-order axioms cannot be a satisfactory definition of the real numbers.
But some people don't want to accept definitions that are not based on first-order axioms. And this is not as crazy as it might sound. First-order axioms are very nice from a theoretic point of view. For example, with first-order axioms it is absolutely clear what it means to prove something based on those axioms. With second-order axioms, the situation is a lot hairier.