So I see a lot of tensions in this thread between views of privacy advocates in India opposing Aadhar (accused of having some other kind of agenda) and privacy advocates outside India opposing it (accused of not knowing much about India).

Although this thread has included discussions about both Indian and non-Indian opposition, the privacy community outside India is quite relevant because the original article is a (U.S.-based) Mozilla post criticizing Aadhar.

I'm a privacy advocate outside India accused of not knowing much about India, to which I can readily confess. I have unfortunately not yet had the opportunity to visit India. As I said, I don't know which party was in power when Aadhar was first developed, nor do I know which party is in power now, nor have I witnessed the situation of the rural communities often described as the biggest Aadhar beneficiaries.

I do find it sad that the notion of hypocrisy or disproportionate concern has taken on such a high profile in this thread.

Like you said, I am typing this on a device assembled in China. I've thought about the possibility that the Chinese state (in whose territory this device was shipped), the American state (through those territory this device was shipped and in whose territory its CPU was designed), or the Swedish, Dutch, German, Swiss, Italian, Portuguese, Brazilian, Singaporean, Taiwanese, British, or Chinese states, among others (through those territory I've carried this device), may have used their access to backdoor it somehow.

I find these possibilities deeply tragic. I'm very grateful that so many people around the world are working to expose, detect, and fight back against the ways in which governments may tamper with our devices. People who do that are my heroes, and I hope their community will grow and grow. If a manufacturer can show how it's better-protected its users against supply chain attacks, I will be really excited to consider its products.