Requiring secure contexts for all new features (opens in new tab)

(blog.mozilla.org)

159 pointsjwarren8y ago17 comments

17 comments

They probably should've linked to a better intro to Secure Contexts than a standards document. Here's a simple explanation for them from Mozilla:

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

Features Restricted to Secure Contexts:

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

Chrome's Secure Origins seem to be the same thing:

https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/prefer-secur...

annevk8y ago

I adjusted the post to take your feedback into account. Thanks!

niftich8y ago

This seems reasonable.

Declarative code, such as HTML or CSS, which describe particular behaviors of rendering from a broad, but limited palette, are a different severity from imperative code that can interact with various features of your host platform.

As a user, for the web execution trust model to work, you need to know that the code you're about to execute was vetted by originating site and not altered in transit. TLS provides this. It won't help you with easing the cognitive load of making that decision, or extending your trust model to third-party origins referred to by the site you visit, but it does provide baseline assurance that the content wasn't tampered with by an agent that wasn't a party known to you or your origin ahead of time.

As a side-effect, this move serves to further segregate the document-based 'legacy' web and the new web that's an application delivery platform. In my opinion, any move that sets these two use-cases further apart, without necessarily impacting the nameplate usability expectation of either, is a welcome step.

pavon8y ago

The post states that any new features including something as simple as a CSS property will now require a secure context, regardless of whether the new feature exposes more security risk or not. This is a marked departure from the declarative markup vs imperative scripts distinction that you make, or any other risk analysis which has guided which features require a secure context in the past. It doesn't distinguish between simple web pages and web applications. Instead it is a blanket policy that if you don't encrypt, you will not be able to use any modern web standards, period.

ilikethiscmnt8y ago

Correct me here if I'm wrong but the linked article actually uses the example of a new CSS property as an instance of something that would _not_ require a security context.

1 more reply

ams61108y ago

> you need to know that the code you're about to execute was vetted by originating site and not altered in transit. TLS provides this.

TLS provides the latter, but certainly not the former. Many sites are serving JS that they cloned from some github repo and have never looked at beyond that.

nicolaslem8y ago

My eye got caught by the author's signature on the side: "Standards hacker. Mozillian. Loves talking about turning the web into an OS."

I'm personally going the opposite direction, I started using browsing with JS disabled a while ago and found my browsing experience improved.

With the recent security issues, is that really the way we want to go?

Ajedi328y ago

I actually quite like the security model of the web.

All code is considered untrusted except for the OS (browser) itself. Permissions are fine-grained, explicit, optional, and enabled on a site-by-site basis. Even basic things, like an application's ability to play audio or execute JavaScript aren't entirely taken for granted and can be controlled by the user.

Overall, I think the web does a pretty good job of balancing security with user convenience. Certainly better than any other mainstream platform I'm aware of.

albertgoeswoof8y ago

Probably, you’re putting an extra layer of protection (the browser sandbox) between the attack vector and your system.

earenndil8y ago

But by doing that you're feeling ok with running untrusted code which could easily exploit the JIT. Whereas with native code you have to trust it so you'll only run good trusted code.

1 more reply

SimeVidas8y ago

Turn on Tracking Protection in Firefox and add a blocker such as Ghostery, and you will have both performance/security and enhanced functionality.

Scaevolus8y ago

New CSS properties are only going to work in secure contexts?

How is local development supposed to occur?

E: there's going to be some flag to enable it for development

kam8y ago

http://localhost and file:// are considered secure contexts according to https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

bzbarsky8y ago

file://, http://localhost, and http://127.0.0.1 (as well as some other defined-to-be-localhost IPs) are all considered "secure contexts".

There's still a problem here, of course: things can work locally but fail when deployed to an http:// site.

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse

17 comments

nickpsecurity8y ago

They probably should've linked to a better intro to Secure Contexts than a standards document. Here's a simple explanation for them from Mozilla:

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

Features Restricted to Secure Contexts:

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

Chrome's Secure Origins seem to be the same thing:

https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/prefer-secur...

annevk8y ago

I adjusted the post to take your feedback into account. Thanks!

niftich8y ago

This seems reasonable.

pavon8y ago

ilikethiscmnt8y ago

Correct me here if I'm wrong but the linked article actually uses the example of a new CSS property as an instance of something that would _not_ require a security context.

1 more reply

ams61108y ago

> you need to know that the code you're about to execute was vetted by originating site and not altered in transit. TLS provides this.

TLS provides the latter, but certainly not the former. Many sites are serving JS that they cloned from some github repo and have never looked at beyond that.

nicolaslem8y ago

My eye got caught by the author's signature on the side: "Standards hacker. Mozillian. Loves talking about turning the web into an OS."

I'm personally going the opposite direction, I started using browsing with JS disabled a while ago and found my browsing experience improved.

With the recent security issues, is that really the way we want to go?

Ajedi328y ago

I actually quite like the security model of the web.

Overall, I think the web does a pretty good job of balancing security with user convenience. Certainly better than any other mainstream platform I'm aware of.

albertgoeswoof8y ago

Probably, you’re putting an extra layer of protection (the browser sandbox) between the attack vector and your system.

earenndil8y ago

But by doing that you're feeling ok with running untrusted code which could easily exploit the JIT. Whereas with native code you have to trust it so you'll only run good trusted code.

1 more reply

SimeVidas8y ago

Turn on Tracking Protection in Firefox and add a blocker such as Ghostery, and you will have both performance/security and enhanced functionality.

Scaevolus8y ago

New CSS properties are only going to work in secure contexts?

How is local development supposed to occur?

E: there's going to be some flag to enable it for development

kam8y ago

http://localhost and file:// are considered secure contexts according to https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure...

bzbarsky8y ago

file://, http://localhost, and http://127.0.0.1 (as well as some other defined-to-be-localhost IPs) are all considered "secure contexts".

There's still a problem here, of course: things can work locally but fail when deployed to an http:// site.

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse