1. If your WAF can be fooled by adding a X-Forwarded-For header, trouble ahead.
2. If your security strategy is about mitigating attacks where the payload matches some regular expressions, trouble ahead. Machine learning? Double trouble ahead.
3. If you don't write only completely static queries[1] to then use as prepared statements or use a proper ORM[2] when using a SQL database, trouble ahead.
[1] https://www.akadia.com/services/dyn_modify_where_clause.html
[2] Like linq, jOOQ...
We've added SQL filtering as a defense-in-depth measure, having a convenient seat in the architecture, complementing every other mitigation measure proper application developers and DBAs should be doing (and frequently get wrong).
Even ORMs get bypassed once in a while:
- https://github.com/mysqljs/mysql/issues/342 - https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/issues/5671 - (okay, we can avoid this one by saying nothing "nothing proper exists in NodeJS world) https://bertwagner.com/2018/03/06/2-5-ways-your-orm-will-all...
Dumb concatenation can nullify the merit of quite advanced ORM: copybook example of misusing Ruby's ActiveRecord (is that proper enough) got as far as OWASP testing guide: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_ORM_Injection_(O...
Prepared statements are cooked wrong as well, but rarely, that's why they are viable line of defense, but not the sole one (as nothing should be):
https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/ww9qm/sqli_bypassin... https://stackoverflow.com/questions/134099/are-pdo-prepared-...
(in fact, I've seen with my eyes exactly what first comment in reddit postmentions).
For anyone curious why WAFs are so useless, there is a very beginner-accessible talk by Joe McCray here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBVThFwdYTc
1. Insiders having access to database front?
2. Same SQL bypass techniques as employed to bypass WAFs?
3. Mitigate developer errors in query logic which enable custom injections?