1. There have been 865 737 related ASRS reports since 1/1/2018
2. I don't know how to quickly separate out 737-MAX reports from the non 737-MAX reports, as the ASRS database doesn't include 737-MAX as an airplane type! From scanning, I can say that there are more than five MAX related reports, though.
[1] All 865 737 reports since 1/1/2018
CSV - http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=546686797940621...
DOC - http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=726497188798253...
[2] Airplane model filter with no MAX option: https://imgur.com/a/09rRtzX
[3] ASRS database: https://titan-server.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSPublicQueryWizard/Quer...
[4] Document linked in the article with plane models listed under 737-800 or 737-Next Generation Undifferentiated https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766398-ASRS-Reports...
1583028: B737 MAX-8 Captain reported the engine fuel burn was higher than expected. Maintenance confirms that several 737-MAXs are burning fuel faster than expected.
1593699: ATIS sheet fell through the slot forward of the center pedestal and the blank off plate. We had Maintenance come out to remove it. We discovered 20 other ATIS sheets mixed into the wiring. The aircraft is only six months old. Severe potential fire hazard!
1538699: B737 MAX pilots reported flying through the final approach course and descending below published altitudes due to confusion with the new style instrument displays.
1603376: B737 Captain reported the flight recorder light was inoperative, which led to the discovery that the flight data recorder was not installed.
Can anyone anyone with more experience with this say whether this is normal for a new aircraft? I get that it's easy to forget parts of the assembly process, but how do you put an aircraft into service without verifying that all the parts (especially important parts like this one) are installed?
1593017: B737MAX Captain expressed concern that some systems such as the MCAS are not fully described in the aircraft Flight Manual.
Edit: A CSV of all incidents that include "MAX" in their report text: https://pastebin.com/ezhffWRn
"737.{0,20}max" (case insensitive) yields 20. [0]
[0] CSV output: https://pastebin.com/87N023cx
"I had my first flight on the Max [to] ZZZ1. We found out we were scheduled to fly the aircraft on the way to the airport in the limo. We had a little time [to] review the essentials in the car. Otherwise we would have walked onto the plane cold.My post flight evaluation is that we lacked the knowledge to operate the aircraft in all weather and aircraft states safely.
The instrumentation is completely different - My scan was degraded, slow and labored having had no experience w/ the new ND (Navigation Display) and ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) presentations/format or functions (manipulation between the screens and systems pages were not provided in training materials. If they were, I had no recollection of that material).
We were unable to navigate to systems pages and lacked the knowledge of what systems information was available to us in the different phases of flight. Our weather radar competency was inadequate to safely navigate significant weather on that dark and stormy night. These are just a few issues that were not addressed in our training.
I recommend the following to help crews w/ their introductory flight on the Max:Email notification the day before the flight (the email should include: Links - Training Video, PSOB and QRG and all relevant updates/FAQ's)SME (Subject Matter Expert) Observer - the role of the SME is to introduce systems navigation, display management, answer general questions and provide standardized best practices to the next generation aircraft.Additionally, the SME will collect de-identified data to provide to the training department for analysis and dissemination to the line pilots regarding FAQs and know systems differences as well best practices in fly the new model aircraft."
[EDIT] Fixed ACN Number
As far as I am aware (totally a layperson), there have been potentially only 3 potential 737-MAX MCAS trim issue occurrences:
1. The Lion Air flight prior to the fatal lion air flight
2. The Lion air flight which crashed
3. The Ethiopian flight which crashed
Of course I don't think any of those 3 are absolutely confirmed, but I do think it seems likely the three had MCAS trim related issues. If the success rate for pilots dealing with this issue just 1 in 3, does that say anything regarding the MCAS issue difficulty/complexity or the skill/training of pilots?
ACN: 1597286
"Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively."
ACN: 1597380
"It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat.
Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+.
Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"
I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one).
With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on "descending" was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue."
ACN: 1593017
"The recently released 737 MAX8 Emergency Airworthiness Directive directs pilots how to deal with a known issue, but it does nothing to address the systems issues with the AOA system.
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.
This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication highlights that an entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This system is now the subject of an AD.
I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place, and failure modes.
I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must insist that Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals."
(1) The third report says that MCAS only operates in manual flight. The second report appears to confirm that since the pilot says he engaged autopilot sooner than usual to remove the possible MCAS threat.
(2) However, both the first and second reports describe uncommanded pitch down events while in autopilot. That means there is another problem in addition to the MCAS issue, since the latter should not be engaged at all when in autopilot. (If the root problem is an unreliable angle of attack sensor, that would explain both issues, since the AoA sensor would be used by the autopilot as well as by the MCAS.)
(3) We have an aircraft type that is known to have repeated uncommanded pitch down events while in autopilot, and it's still flying. Unfortunately, we already have other aircraft types (from Airbus, not Boeing) that have the same known issue that have not been grounded either. So the system as a whole simply seems to accept the risk of this happening without warning, and hoping that pilots will be able to respond as these pilots did (well done to them) and avoid an actual incident.
"The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag"
Notice they have never briefed you about this new system because they didn't want to retrain you.
You happily drive along the highway at 70mph when the system malfunctions and incorrectly thinks the car is over-steering left, so the steering wheel starts rotating clockwise. The car swiftly moves to the lane in your right as you use all your strength to prevent it and manage to bring the car back in the lane.
In the mean time all kind of lights and sounds go off on your cockpit. In 5 seconds, while you are trying to find out what to make out of all the lights flashing, the steering wheel starts turning the card right again. This time you are not so lucky and you crash into the truck on your right.
At least you don't have to get a new endorsement on your license for every model of car.
In Germany, if you get your drivers license on an automatic car, then you are only allowed to drive automatic cars, and have to extend your license to drive manual cars.
MCAS doesn't behave like a runaway stabilizer. MCAS adjusts the trim periodically and will back off if you apply opposite trim.
The steps to deal with runaway trim are[1]:
1 Control column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hold firmly
2 Autopilot (if engaged) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disengage
Do not re-engage the autopilot
Control airplane pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as needed.
3 If the runaway stops:
■ ■ ■ ■
1: http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick%20Reference%20Handboo...
I'm not saying cars are safer. But using accident count per mileage seems a bit odd, especially when the most risky parts of flying are taking off and landing.
A plane travelling 400 more miles doesn't incur much more risk. But a car travelling 400 more miles incur a much bigger risk (e.g. fatigue, car malfunctioning). So, of course, the stats for planes is going to look much better.
I wonder if anyone has an insight into why we are using this metrics, and what is a better metrics?
That doesn't discount the fact that most of the risk is in take-off/landing, so if you use fleet-average statistics you'll bias the risk of short flights low and long flight high. Air safety studies do also use additional metrics like accidents/hour and accidents/segment, but those are mostly useful for comparing between different types of aviation.
Ignoring the silly ones (Space Shuttle, Skidiving and Paragliding), we see that Motorcycles are by far the most dangerous mode of transport, across all metrics. Buses do very well, only losing out to Aircraft on distance.
When you look at Aircraft by number of journeys, the risk is significantly higher - nearly 3 times higher than car journeys!
That said, there are othe factors to consider here: these metrics only track _deaths_. So non-fatal incidents (of which the majority involving cars are) aren't considered.
It seems, if the risk is based on the distance, then air is 60x safer. But, for per journeys, air travel is worse. For per hours, the air travel is only 3x safer.
The popularized concept of air travel's risk gave me the impression that air travel was sooo much safer than car. smh. If you asked me a month ago, I would say air travel should be, at least, 1000x safer than car.
I would point out that in a similar way few people drive between continents but flight is common.
https://www.bts.gov/content/fatality-rates-mode
For the sake of argument, assume cars travel an average of only 10 mph, and air carriers carry just 50 passengers (low estimates tilt the comparison in favor of cars). That would mean cars had 1.1 fatality for every 10 million hours in 2015. The corresponding figure has been between 0.0 and 0.6 for the last decade, and airlines come out way ahead even after amortizing the 5.8 from 2001 over the following years. And this is with very conservative assumptions.
On the other hand if you add in non-occupant deaths, the numbers might work out better for cars, even after using less conservative assumptions, once you amortize the non-occupant deaths from 9/11.
And traveling by air seems to be 3x more deadly than by car, if measuring by journey.
IIRC, after the existence of MCAS was disclosed, the US pilots' unions were divided over this issue, with the union representing Southwest pilots castigating Boeing for its nondisclosure, while that representing United pilots did not consider it to be a big issue. Unfortunately, this article does not make it clear where pilots stand on issue 3, and the investigation of the Ethiopian Airlines crash might reveal additional issues.
The forthcoming software upgrade for MCAS certainly implies that there were improvements to be made.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing...
A little scary?
Not according to Boeing... "Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer."[1]
To me an incredibly infuriating statement. The 737-MAX has a fatal crash rate of ~4 per million, when compared to .1 per million for the 737-NG models (40x). There is no currently flying major commercial aircraft which has a higher fatal crash rate than the 737-MAX [2] [3] Of course the MAX has a small sample size, but that's still not evidence of safety.
What data is Boeing looking at to show that their aircraft is considered a safe aircraft?
[1] https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=1...
[2] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-737-crashes-liability-...
The reality is in a very short space of time two 737-MAX have fallen out of the sky.
You only have to look back at the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 to understand once a plane gets a bad reputation, it is doomed.
For an example of how this can go bad so very quickly, here in Australia this issue has become so new worthy, it's now been revealed one our major carriers is planning to introduce the 737-MAX in November.
I suspect just that little fact is going to become a major headache for that particular carrier.
If it fails this frequently, yes. Obviously pilots need to be informed about the failure modes of the planes they fly - but they also need to not be constantly subjected to them. Modern commercial aircraft are supposed to be waaay more reliable than this.
My question is, should the onus be on the pilots? Yes, they should know about it if they're going to be piloting an aircraft with it, but is this expected behavior? To me it seems more like a bug than expected behavior...why would you want to pitch downwards in a climb?
I don't really understand defense of Boeing in any scenario. This seems like a mistake in any case, whether it's just lack of instruction or documentation in the relevant flight manuals, or an outright system failure.
Because due to the different shape and position of the nacelles, there are aerodynamic effects that cause the plane to want to pitch up at high AoA. If you are already close to a stall condition, and you were caught unawares, bad times would be had.
The major issue though is pilots were left to 'just figure this out' instead of being informed of the change. I have a feeling Boeing felt justified doing this because they pitched it as a "reconfiguration" of an old airframe, not warranting any explanation.
As with any task I've attempted that involves deadly failure modes, this should have struck someone as being a terrible idea.
To the uninitiated, it seems that problems in airline incidents used to revolve around mechanical failures, bad wiring, sensor malfunctions, toasted electronics causing smell of smoke and such. Plain and simple. Issue a fix in the design and apply to all planes of the same type, and you'll end up reducing the failure surface bit by bit.
I might be totally wrong about this because I don't track actual data. But if I've spotted the trend right it's scary because the problems are shifting into our space, i.e. software engineering. And being a software engineer, I know we're pretty much fucked at that point. We've only ever managed to write reliable and trustworthy software when we've split it into very tiny pieces that we can verify and kept the number of pieces small.
Maybe aviation computers used to be much simpler that they could be verified more throughoutly. Maybe airplanes used to have less features and they could keep the complexity sufficiently down and functionality orthogonal. Maybe there was enough human glue in between the systems so that there was a live sanity-check during flights and pilots could react properly if the computers didn't agree on something.
But now I sense a new category of error conditions that are eerily similar to what we've had in non-critical software for decades where assumptions are laid on top of other assumptions, and when they fail the whole stack comes crashing down. Only this time there might be a whole plane coming down instead of getting a curious SIGSEGV on the screen with a blinking cursor. It might start as an innocent "couldn't access flight plan because of wifi went down" but such interdependencies between certified and uncertified systems grow exponentially and this will snowball into the unmanageable very soon.
> My company's error rates have increased on the "common fleet" by almost triple. [1]
The aircraft manufacturers and carriers want to get the most change with the least impact: updated jets with better gas mileage that don’t require pilots to retrain. It seems the FAA and other regulators have become too lenient in letting the manufacturers put significant changes into aircraft without requiring them to have different type ratings or at least add new training requirements.[2] Not communicating the MCAS changes seems to indicate a broken process at Boeing too.[3]
But you are also observing the Swiss cheese model of safety.[4] As the easier individual issues are fixed (mechanical) more difficult compound issues cause the accident, where multiple things (pilot training, bad communication, new system) all need to line up.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19376565
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_rating
Is this a lot?
In addition, it seems like some pilots were motivated to submit reports on their MAX experiences due to the Lion Air incident.
I'm appalled at Boeing's response, and I agree with the Europeans, other countries, and Senator Cruz and others that the planes should probably be grounded, at least very briefly.
But the news reporting that an unknown-relative-to-other-planes percentage of complaints were filed by pilots, especially when those reports could theoretically be merely annoyed pilots responding to a perceived lack of training, or piling on after Lion Air, doesn't tell me a whole lot I didn't already know.
eg. search for ACN 1337942 here https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/dbol.html (i'm too dumb to figure out how to link to a specific nasa report), and there's a report about the captain's side AOA vane being busted and causing the captain's stick shaker to vibrate constantly.
edit: here's another one: 1097906, talking about inconsistent airspeed readings between the captain and first officer and then on descent, the airspeed readings went super wonky and the plane pitched nose down.
This is not actually any kind of right in the US. The airline can switch to using a MAX just before the flight boards without breaking any law or contract with you, and would not have to honor your request to travel on a non-MAX aircraft instead.
After the Lion Air crash the FAA released a Emergency Airworthiness Directive, these five comments are in response to that directive. That differentiates it from pilots that had a negative run-in with MCAS or other defects in the 737 Max 8 (which would be significant news).
This article might inform you pilots are unhappy, but that fact has been widely circulated elsewhere since the Lion Air crash. The fact that five pilots submitted official comments doesn't add to what we knew.
These comments for example wouldn't have helped inform the FAA's decisions, since the FAA told the pilots about the issues in the Emergency Airworthiness Directive that these comments are based upon.
"Boeing Co. withheld information about potential hazards associated with a new flight-control feature suspected of playing a role in last month's fatal Lion Air jet crash, according to safety experts involved in the investigation, as well as midlevel FAA officials and airline pilots."
"Safety experts involved in and tracking the investigation said that at U.S. carriers, neither airline managers nor pilots had been told such a system had been added to the latest 737 variant — and therefore aviators typically weren't prepared to cope with the possible risks."
It was very helpful for me to understand exactly what "runaway trim" meant. Essentially, it's a force (down or up) on the elevator on the horizontal stabilizer. The pilot still controls it from his yoke, but the more trim applied the more it pushes the result in a given direction. If the system applies trim consistently to push the nose down (to avoid what it thinks is an imminent staff), it will progressively more difficult for the pilot to counteract that and pitch up. Eventually, it's too much to handle.
This situation should be easily detectable, from what I understand, due to large wheels moving visibly in the center console, and the pilots can counteract the trim in a known procedure.
Sometimes clustering occurs, such as Maylasian airlines being shot down and lost in an ocean and never found. We didn't ground the whole airline.
I don't think the data prove airworthiness of the Max anymore.
What, except for the data of the two crashes happening? The person that wrote this statement is a fucking idiot.
Please learn some basic geography. Norway (and Switzerland) are not in the EU.
"Premature optimization is the root of all evil" -- KnuthBetween this and Tesla Autopilot I'm left speechless.
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/ground-boeing-737-...
https://www.change.org/p/your-government-ground-the-boeing-7...
So they lied. Even if it's safer to fly a SW max than AA.
> A spokesperson for Southwest Airlines told The News that it hasn't received any reports of issues with MCAS from its pilots, "nor do any of our thousands of data points from the aircraft indicate any issues with MCAS."
And hope Boeing is NOT simulating https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_control
> In order to increase fuel efficiency on the 737 MAX, the engine fan diameter was increased;
> "Premature optimization is the root of all evil" -- Knuth
UPDATE: And this news website even detects if I use incognito mode: "To continue reading, please disable private/incognito mode, log in, or enroll as a member" omg
But the article is very light on details
(I am surfing from the EU)
Its also not free. Rational companies will apply a cost benefit analysis to GDPR compliance and some of them will determine it is better to block EU visitors than to do the GDPR work.
This is a real cost of the GDPR. If enforcement ticks up more companies will do the cost/benefit and some will decide to withdraw from the European internet. That leads to a more fractured web.
If you think there's a compelling business case for enabling European access, you may wish to contact the publisher.