> The law will create an independent infrastructure for the Russian internet, or "Runet," which will essentially allow Russia to pull up its virtual drawbridges in case of attack.
If your power plants are at risk of hacking you don't prepare by planning to shutdown the internet - you prepare by making sure it can work when unplugged them from insecure networks. Because if loss of said connectivity would cause problems shutting it down is no help and if it doesn't there is no need to boost collateral damage - unleas that is the /real/ goal.
EU is just settings rules for the internal EU market.
We know that in certain countries there exist "single points" where a majority of internet traffic flows [0], but if those points get cut off, couldn't you reroute the traffic? Isn't that the point of decentralization in the first place?
And if it's technically feasible, would encryption tools like VPNs, DNS encryption or even Tor help in a situation like this?
[0] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-business/wp/2014...
That's the theory anyway. In practice, I assume Russian web services are just as dependant on third-party providers as the rest of us are.
All in all, every connection to outside will be under the control of RKN and the gov, so no matter how you route, you're going through these points. Pretty much the Chinese model—afaik there's not much choice if you're trying to do about the same thing.
However satellite or other wireless internet not under their control would work unless enforced ad bacculum or through jammers. Anything which depends upon external international IP addresses would break.
VPNs and related would only come into play with unauthorized international connections and the forwarder so it appears traffic is to another domestic address.
