I had summarized public information and questions from as the implosion was happening, trying to be impartial and not voice my guesses as to what actually went on, and concluded that everyone should be given the benefit of the doubt, given all the unknowns.
But that impartiality could be upsetting to one of the parties (by bringing up things that, say, a good guy maybe can't talk about), and maybe this isn't the time, as people are recovering and moving forward.
At the same time, HN people might need to know some lessons from this noteworthy incident in development and privacy&security, since it should inform how we think about how other projects and startups can fail.
For example: a prominent security product can suddenly be compromised (e.g., in the sense of trusted security update mechanism broken, or a change in who controls updates), or a business partner can force out you and your intentions/stewardship of the product that you think depends on you being in the loop to not be evil, or a different business partner can delete very important keys, or (vaguely) this is another way it can be difficult to reconcile privacy&security goals with business ones.
These failures might be things we briefly consider as hypotheticals when planning or evaluating, but they do happen, in real life, on prominent efforts.
