In my understanding once you remove all the layers of abstraction as some point it's a bunch of databases and data stores. Someone has to manage them. Why wouldn't a breach of those users be able to do whatever they want?
And a higher level, someone is writing the code to implement such a stringent access system. Why wouldn't a breach of those users (or a rogue employee) be able to accomplish bad things?
We all know access controls and multiple operators are good, yeah. But at the heart of it is still a bunch of linux machines that have to be managed and deployed to. Which as far as I know has no mechanism for check with operator x before running command from operator 0.
Presumably this database runs on some machine? And this machine was logged into in order to install and setup the database?
That would be good from a security perspective, but it would cost additional training, require more support staff, increase response time between request and resolve, make the system more complex and possible fragile, and take development resources away from profit centers.
Most companies has likely, at best, the same security at their internal support center as their accounting department, and given how common CEO fraud is, it mean social engineering will likely continue to be a major attack vector for a long time.
Same as when a journalist in the UK got a temp job in BT's office in Edinburgh and looked up the queens unlisted phone numbers at Balmoral - lead to a major security incident and massive changes.
This was a v high profile project we had two board members as sponsors.
Later on I knew that some team leaders had to be Vetted and this is Developed Vetting - this is the same as TS clearance
I could see this happening in FANG companies to
