If I had to guess, the attackers probably didn't even need twitter employees to have direct access to the accounts. If support tools allow Twitter support staff to change a user's email (which would make more sense, but still be extraordinarily unsecure), you basically get full access to the accounts the moment you get control over those tools. It would also explain why all the account emails seem to have been changed.

But even then, that there is no system to detect mass modifications and no delay before the changes take place is incredible. Unless they were able to social engineer their way into multiple employee's accounts to avoid detection, which would be an incredibly bad problem by itself.

Twitter seems to have a shaky history when it comes to limiting employee access to account info.

Well, it's actually not that hard to fall for social engineering even if you're well educated about the topic. Have a listen to an interview Christopher Hadnagy gave on Darknet Diaries.