I would like this to be right but then I ran into

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197300

which discusses economic limitations to the incentives for blockchain mining. (One part is that if a cryptocurrency gets too valuable, the value of a double-spend attack could exceed some models of the reward for honest mining. Another part is that if you have unregulated derivatives, you can own a negative amount of cryptocurrency, which means that your financial incentive can be to actively damage the cryptocurrency rather than helping it. Satoshi's paper seems to assume that you can only own a positive or zero amount of bitcoin rather than a negative amount, when arguing why miners are incentivized to be honest.)

(This is also true for the ability to short, or insure, any asset -- you can be financially incentivized to damage it -- but elsewhere this incentive is partly countered by law enforcement investigations of some trades and insurance claims where people profited significantly from accidents, disasters, or scandals. Smart contracts on blockchains let us build insurance and derivatives markets where you can bet against things without identifying yourself. In fact the whole underlying discussion here is about how the person who claimed this particular asset in Ethereum is anonymous and probably can't be punished for doing so, even if we believed that the claimant wasn't entitled to make this claim. That could be equally true if the person were collecting an insurance contract payout. That's potentially fine if contracts can't create new incentives to cause harm, but maybe not so awesome if they can.)