While having the source available is not a panacea, it would seem that, at least in the case you mentioned, not having the source code would have allowed for the cheating to continue with impunity, as there would have been no way for anyone to begin to discover what had been going on. That would suggest that having the source available is a necessary part of establishing real trust, even if it's not sufficient.

> While I agree with your intent, the problem is that, many open source software is not verifiable.

To me, this sentence reads as "That a nice idea, but untenable in practice." rather than "Open source is necessary, but shouldn't be considered sufficient." which strikes me as counter-productive to the objective of easily verifiable software.

> many open source software is not verifiable

Open source software is more verifiable than closed source though.

Yeah, you are definitely correct on the lack of verification tools and I hope research on that one day breaks out of academia and into more common usage. The Kaggle story is great. One mildly related thing is Purism's bootloader tampering detection with their "librem key". Naturally it does nothing to verify the running code, but it does feel like knowing you're running the code you thought you were has some merit.

I think maybe some replies have interpreted my comment as naively assuming that open source firmware would would mean complete trust. I just think it is a good step on the journey.