There's an important misconception here.

The part you're right about is that simulating what we understand about our own reality on some subset of that reality (e.g. some kind of computer) is really, really hard, possibly verging on impossible.

But that's not really the simulation hypothesis at all.

It's relatively easy to build a simulation of a simplified or (and this is important) a different reality in some subset of our own. Trivial examples like Conway's Game of Life come to mind, but also (somewhat obviously) SimCity.

The simulation hypothesis is that our reality is a simulation running in some subset of a different reality. Given what we know about building simulations in our own reality, the hypothesis implicitly recognizes that the meta-reality in which which our reality is a simulation is necessarily different (and likely more complex) than our own.

There's an even deeper notion to the simulation hypothesis. If our reality is a "simulation", given the richness that we see around us, what is the difference between a "simulation" and something that isn't a simulation? Based on what I said above, the different "levels" would necessarily need to differ in terms of their own complexity. But is a reality in which our own could be simulated really any "better" than our own?

This all assumes that the limitations of our universe are the same as the limitations on the hardware outside the simulation.

We can run Conway's game, but a being inside that simulation, contemplating it's existence, would have no way to even begin to think about quantum computing.

The rules are just too different.

That being said, I almost look at the finite speed of light, and quantum effects as shortcuts to simulation.

The light speed limit allows greater parallelization by reducing the number of particles inside the local light cone. Likewise, quantum effects seem like a compiler optimization where a calculation isn't performed until the result is needed.

It's fun to think about, but I doubt we will ever know for sure either way.

It seems to be purely an issue of computing power, not feasibility. That’s why it’s conceivable that future advances would make it feasible.

Like if in 1950 you looked at a computer and thought “there’s no way to make realistic 3D graphics”.

OK, somewhat stale already... But WTH, there are still "Reply" links, so AFAICS replying is acceptable. And the "reverse-perspective" rebuttal I'm about to propose hasn't been proposed so far.

> OK, but I'm saying the burden of proof is on who think that simulation is possible. It's not at all obvious that it is.

You seem to be arguing about whether it's possible to simulate this reality, the one we're in, within itself. That's like saying Sim City is impossible, because you can't build the computer Sim City is running on in Sim City; you can't have your Sims build a PC and then run that same copy of the Sim City game on that simulated PC.

If we and the universe we live in are all part of a simulation, that simulation can be running on something that cannot be built in our universe -- within that simulation itself -- without, AFAICS, that constituting any logical contradiction.

Or, IOW: Ants can build anthills, but we can build ant farms. If an ant claims "I can't be living in an ant farm; there can be no such thing, because we ants don't know how to make one!"... Then it is wrong.

In the simulation hypothesis, it is not necessary for humans to know how to build the simulation environment, because in that hypothesis we aren't the simulation builders. We're just the Sims (or ants).

If we go around demanding proof of every hypothesis before considering its implications, we will find that we have very little to think about. Not even mathematics and philosophy are conducted at this level of rigor.

The burden of proof is a double-edged sword: it can be used to rein in tendentiousness, but also to avoid discussing an issue.