From the paper:

> Another example is the following censored post supporting the state. It accuses the local leader Ran Jianxin, whose death in police custody triggered protests in Lichuan, of corruption:

> “According to news from the Badong county propaganda department web site, when Ran Jianxin was party secretary in Lichuan, he exploited his position for personal gain in land requisition, building demolition, capital construction projects, etc. He accepted bribes, and is suspected of other criminal acts.”

One way collective action potential is measured is by measuring the virality of a post.

“Let’s form a patriotic march to support the govt on day X”

If there are to be such marches, it is the govt which will organize them. Not bottom up action, not via any process which could generate alternate leaders, power structures, organizations, etc

Anti-Japanese collective action, which nominally aligns with the interest of the government, would occur every year but it's clamped down early. When uninhibited, it culminates in riots where sushi restaurants, Japanese cars, buildings with Japanese consulates are torched and demolished.

The owners of those are fellow Chinese citizens who become understandably ticked off and come to the government for redress for the damage and can be a right pain. So it's less work to maintain public order and not let demonstrations like in 2012 spiral out of control.