I spent a lot of time talking about this topic with people. The article does have a point, that the security model of proof of stake is fundamentally different and relies on a key assumption (from the article you linked):
> any new node coming onto the network with no knowledge except... the set of all blocks and other "important" messages that have been published...
This is referenced in the OP as a point of security failure. The assumption is that we can rely on social interactions between nodes and that that is good enough. The criticism is that a new node can have no way of definitively knowing that their copy of the chain is the widely used canonical chain. An eclipse attack can occur, or as the OP stated new nodes may need to rely on authoritative sources to get current state which puts centralized power centers in the security model.
It is not a deal breaker (IMO), remember, PoW relies on the security assumption that it is prohibitively difficult for more than half the network to collude. I'd argue these assumptions are equally tenuous. I think as long as disparate, non colluding sources of the canonical chain are available (arguable if this is foregone, seeing as we need PoW to ensure consensus and resistance to collusion, probably not, but all it takes is one person to not collude and contention exists) it wouldn't be a problem.
Another big sticking point is the fact that no external resources must be invested, and/or that there is no ongoing cost. I find this to be the big problem with PoS schemes, I've had quite a number of discussions focused on these two particular issues (stemming from the same fundamental difference, that an internal capital stake is made) and I see benefits of not having ongoing cost and benefits of having it, and also of having a fully self contained system as well as having a system grounded in the outside world. All in all I have come to the conclusion that these differences make neither better nor worse, but that they are simply two completely different game theoretical environments with different security and incentive properties.