https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c...
It would not surprise me if OpenSSH only chooses to add SPHINCS+ and refuses the others.
Should NIST be disregarded?
NTRU-prime is not a finalist, but OpenSSH has decided that the NIST designation is irrelevant.
https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html
ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"). The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security as the status quo.
We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically- relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently advanced quantum computer is available.
People with qualms about NIST might also reasonably have qualms about AES. And there is a common cipher that people use outside of AES --- Chapoly. But it would be downright weird to use, like, Serpent or Twofish; it would be the cryptography equivalent of a "code smell". Chapoly and AES are the de facto standards, and OpenSSH supports both.
Again though: my question is just, what does this (frankly weird) Bernstein complaint have to do with any of it? Bernstein himself is a NISTPQC participant; he's on one of the (large) winning signature teams.
(I think all the technical details here are super interesting, but not especially motivating; I'm not a cryptographer and you should disregard me as well, but my basic take on QC crypto attacks is "Rodents of unusual size? I don't think they exist.")
It was often a huge problem for the people who he was fighting with, though. Are you one of them?
He was one of the earliest PQC popularizers and probably coined the term. But asserting that he enabled everyone else's work is a little like saying that the person who coined "misuse-resistant authenticated encryption" enabled all the different misuse-resistant schemes; the underlying issue was plainly evident, and people were obviously going to work on it.
Your last sentence falls afoul of the HN guidelines, and your comment would be far stronger without it. Which is unfortunate, since there's an interesting and curious conversation to be had about the significance of Bernstein's role in PQC.
Along with also apparently some possible remarks about DJB doing something wrong also (I couldn't tell from this at least what it was. I haven't done any complete readings yet).