Edit: Ah yes, this is covered in the section "Obtaining the certificate via reboot & exploitation"
Sadly my hardware appears to be patched.
However, AT&T added another layer of authentication in mid-2021 that precludes the use of third-party hardware. I don't think that part has been cracked yet.
I just a few weeks ago got another Arris S33 modem for a client using cable, it's fairly well regarded. While this vulnerability doesn't list those, to me this further highlights how it can be valuable to separate out networking components vs all-in-one. The modem is purely a modem and talks only to the ISP. The router is a SuperMicro system running OPNsense, which then goes out to TP-Link Omada (or UniFi at another older site) gear for switching and WiFi. There is a network control VLAN as well as admin VLAN accessible only via WireGuard, which is the only way to get to the modem's admin page from the LAN. Controllers are self-hosted with network control VLANs at multiple sites again routed via WG to the controller.
While there are other advantages as well in terms of being able to replace parts piecemeal for less, better coverage etc, it's also nice in terms of vulns in one thing doesn't necessarily mean everything else instantly collapses, and it's easier to have multiple layers. The router is still a chokepoint, but full opensource and standard hardware at least mean a lot of extra eyes and tools can be applied to it and one is never at some vendor's mercy for firmware updates. Modem compromise wouldn't affect the LAN beyond potentially messing with WAN access which would be noticeable fairly quickly. Default LAN users can't easily touch any of the infrastructure either. All while being transparently usable with internet of shit stuff that people want to utilize. Full zero-trust or a virtual overlay network might be better yet but starts to run into the same legacy issues that hound so much of the industry particularly for non-tech SoHo/SMB. While it's unfortunate how riddled with issues a lot of ISP devices have tended to be, it's pretty nice what reasonably priced powerful options exist for anyone with networking now across a huge range of skill levels. It could be much better still but it's not nothing.
I have a box somewhere with near-identical Motorola/Arris surfboards other than the logo and color.
I would assume so, but cable modems are such an obvious major target that I'd be very surprised if they didn't check as well so the absence is notable. There may be some divergence due to them not being AIO devices, or requirements from the cable companies over the last decade. Or of course it could be that's still not public disclosure, but that'd be a bit surprising too since I'd expect any attackers to immediately go check every single other Arris product right away on seeing this.
At any rate though while it's something I'll now be keeping an eye on I'm still satisfied that the modems are fairly well walled off too. It's a wild world out there, and incidents like this are nice to point to when management asks if it's worth the bit of extra trouble to have even some minimal separation. Just the performance benefits of having WAPs ideally positioned for wireless vs dictated by where the WAN link comes in is of course helpful as well, there are some real performance and coverage deliverables that everyone can feel in day to day usage that comes from separating out functionality as well. But efforts to go after network infrastructure itself are certainly ongoing too, it's a good compromise target both directly and in terms of pivoting to everything else. From a public good standpoint, router botnets are also a real hassle to the rest of the planet since they're used for a range of other bad activities.
I've done something similar with a Mikrotik CRS-309 as a router and some Ubiquiti U6 Meshes. The fiber ISP here leaves it to the owner to buy their own hardware to connect to a Icotera in bridge mode. I believe it allows the ISP to reduce their operating costs since theres no need to support a complex all in one router / switch / AP. Anything beyond the bridge is the users responsibility.
Not sure if you'll see this but I'll give it a shot, and I haven't entirely switched yet, I've just been starting the process. You can do a quick search for "xoa unifi" here and switch to comments to see a bunch of history, but in short I was a huge fan of Ubiquiti and while never huge did end up installing a few hundred pieces of their gear across a number of sites. But due to a very bad leadership the company has become a dumpster fire of development which became impossible to ignore maybe 3-4 years ago, and since then the trajectory has continued relentlessly with the kind of sickening momentum that we've all seen so often before and is yet so hard to stop. The old forums are dead and community has degraded in turn, there's a lot of textbook bikeshedding, changing around the UI and constantly churning shiny graphs and more hardware while all sorts of bugs and basic reliability issues fester. Really basic critical features left sitting for years. There is no sort of feature or issue tracker. I don't want to repeat everything because it's been such a saga and depressing waste of potential, but the writing has been on the wall for UniFi for a good long while (their PtP/PtMP gear is still viable in many situations though serious issues have cropped up there too in some lines). On the other hand, with a sort of grim irony one of the core promises of UniFi has been proved by this very situation: by enabling full self-hosting and fairly decent isolation and decoupling of functionality, even the company behind it descending hasn't torched things and allowed a more graceful off ramp. I was able to switch all my routing/gateway functionality to OPNsense, giving another few years for the far less problematic switching/wifi. The gear could all be run with a management VLAN routed to the controller via WireGuard tunnels which meant not having to have anything exposed to the general web or even regular LAN users, significantly reducing my concerns about its insecurity. So while I'm sorry it actually became necessary, I definitely feel vindicated about being concerned about subscriptions or cloud lock-in. If this same thing was happening with that it'd be a lot worse.
TP-Link Omada is effectively a UniFi clone and I mean that in the relatively nice sense. They also offer a centralized controller that you can selfhost. I think it's clear who they're gunning after a bit. And it is in many respects rougher being relatively new. The physical design of the hardware is a lot worse which does indeed matter. The product lines are confusing despite having far less old junk. It doesn't have certain cool useful niche hardware. Their build system clearly needs work, Linux release of a given version sometimes randomly lags awhile behind the Windows version for no clear reason. Etc. Even so, the trajectory is very much better. They've made more improvements and added more important functionality in a year then Ubiquiti has in 4. The networks are more reliable and less quirky so far. TP-Link just this year added PPSK capability, which is super useful for networks with a lot of BYOD including all the massive numbers of electronics that don't support WPA-Enterprise or even those that do but have miserable onboarding without some paid solution. People hacked together a proof of concept on UniFi of that over 3 years ago, which Ubiquiti then never bothered with since.
Again, I haven't "switched" entirely yet, except in terms of 100% of routing moving to OPNsense from USGs over the last few years which I've been very happy with. I did one small scale Omada replacement and was satisfied, and just finished a much larger replacement which I'm going to kick the tires on for a while before ripping out the rest of my UniFi gear and moving on for good. So I'm not at the point of strongly recommending it to anyone yet. And it's worth noting too that we're on the very of seeing WiFi 7 kit start to roll out and that is an unusually big deal, since it'll probably be the place where we're really going to see 6 GHz uptake (6E ended up being a bit of a placeholder there). We may never see another big new chunk of spectrum like that released again. So there is good reason to see how that transition is handled over the next 6-9 months anyway.
But with all those caveats I'm still much more bullish on Omada now in the "self-hosted centrally controlled no-dependency switching/wifi network stack" category and happy there is even direct competition for UniFi at all. The concept is solid and the potential was huge, the execution has just been abysmal for a while though is all :(. I'd love if they changed course still but at this point I don't think that can happen unless the company goes through some major challenges. If you don't actually care about avoiding cloud dependencies, more control, or larger scaling/running herd and the like though there are other good options to look like Aruba Instant-On or even various mesh choices, Amazon's Eero offers surprisingly strong performance for the price for example. Lots of stuff is at least better then what most ISPs offer :).
I have an ISP supplied Arris Cable Modem (luckily not vulnerable) and it is dreadful. The UI is shonky, looking at the HTML & CSS underlying it is enough to make you weep, outdated JS libraries, and - seemingly - no software updates.
I could just about understand if it was stable and gave good WiFi - but the ISP's forums are full of people complaining about it.
All I can assume is that Arris is £1 cheaper than the next model, and the ISP have decided that dealing with customer complaints is cheaper than a higher CapEx.
I wish Ziply would officially support more modern DSL modems like the hardware that is in the C4000BG, that modem is able to make marginal DSL circuits perform so much better.
Yes please ignore the comment!
Also, yes, it's a website builder! this comment was to test a notification tool that I'm using right now to notify whenever a new mention of "Typedream" shows up on HackerNews!
There's nothing conceptually wrong with a modem that also contains a NAT firewall/router/switch/(WAP). But in practice, even examining the hardware architecture of a consumer-grade router reveals fundamental design flaws in terms of the monolithic nature of the hardware architecture. Thus, using separate appliances for modem, router, switch, etc., that are physically separated, is still a good idea.
Of course, once you pick apart the shortcomings of a global TCP/IP network itself, it's clear that a single pipe connected directly to the internet is also a horrible idea, security-wise. I have been asking myself of late: "Self, if we were to design the internet from scratch and from security-first principles, how would it look?" Doing so requires detaching entirely from the existing mess we've created. Actually building a new security-first internet with backwards-compatibility would be an enormous increase in complexity, and would put into question the viability of the security of trillions in investment into entrenched global-scale infrastructure. Thus, any attmepts to solve this problen -- essentially boiling the ocean(s) -- is likely to remain (literally) a (multi-)pipe dream.
However, I am hopeful that new initiatives to build out 'hyperscale' and 'edge' clouds will present a genuine opportunity to realize the dream of a secure internet, secure networking, secure devices.
