> I disagree. If someone doesn't pursue their own interests then by logical necessity they are pursueing interests imposed on them.
If you read the text surrounding the quoted language, it uses "own interest" in a narrow sense, not encompassing altruism. If you subscribe to the notion that there is a dichotomy between "own interest" (encompassing altruism) and "the state's interest" then yes your claim is logically valid, but also besides the point. The ethic underlying modern American business ethics conceives that profit maximization maximizes overall social welfare (i.e. it uses the narrower definition of "own interest" that Smith uses, not your broader definition).
> Of course, by disagreeing with that you would prove my point that "social responsibility" is anything but a completely subjective term that varies (greatly) by each individual, and only has power in the context of the State.
Guess what? We live in a state. And we live in a state where most people believe in welfare maximization: the greatest good for the greatest number. And many of those people, in the business context, believe that profit maximization leads to welfare maximization. To the extent that this assumption is incorrect, their behavior is inconsistent with their desired outcomes.
> But what does social obligation mean? If you didn't obligate yourself, then social obligation really means obligation by force, obligation to the State and whatever the State deems an obligation.
You obligate yourself by participating in civilized society. You obligate yourself by exchanging, for the protections of civilized society, the duties of living in a civilized society. You try to separate "the State" from "the people" but in reality "we the people" created "the State" to defend our property interests. "We the people" through "the State" keep big strong men from taking what you conceive of as "your property" and that obligates you to us.
That obligation doesn't necessarily have to involve coercion. To the extent that you don't consider how your business decisions impact society at large, it might simply make you a "bad person." The problem is that we have an ethical system that relieves you of the duty to make that consideration. You can ruthlessly try to maximize shareholder value and still be a "good person." That ethic is predicated on the idea that profit maximization ultimately serves to maximize social welfare. What I'm arguing is that this assumption has been empirically invalidated (or at least drastically limited) and as such we should move towards an ethic that labels people who are socially inconsiderate as "bad people."