> No, saying "signed overflow is a compile-time error" means you're not allowed to do that.

In the vast majority of cases it's not possible to statically determine if signed overflow will occur, so compilers can't do that. I'm sure they would do it, if it were possible.

> Saying "signed overflow is completely undefined" means you are allowed to do that, but it will blow up in your face

No, it does not mean that. You're not allowed to do signed overflow in standard-compliant C, period.

You're allowed to do signed arithmetic, but the arithmetic is not allowed to overflow. You can write code that overflows, but it will not have defined semantics (because that's what the standard says).

And the compiler cannot enforce or emit a warning when overflow occurs because in the general case it's not possible to statically determine if it will occur.

But if the compiler can determine it, then it will emit a warning (at least with -Wall, I think).

And if you pass the `-ftrapv` flag to GCC (and clang, probably), then your code will deterministically fail at runtime if you do signed overflow, but for performance reasons this is not required by the standard.

> > As it would work just fine for some cases (or when certain optimizations are applied or not, or when you use a certain compiler version or Linux distro) but then it would completely break in a slightly different configuration or if you slightly changed the code.

> That sentence is literally indistinguishable from a verbatim quote about the problems with undefined behaviour. Narrowing the scope of possible consequences of signed overflow from "anything whatsoever" to "the kind of problems that are kind of reasonable to have as a result of optimization" is a strict improvement.

No, because experienced programmers don't expect signed overflow to work, because it's not allowed. Such bad code would be caught if you enable UBsan. But if the C standard would require what you propose, then UBsan could not fail when a signed overflow occurs, as that could be a false positive (and therefore make such signed-overflow detection useless).

If you allow signed overflows then you have to define the semantics. And nondeterministic semantics in arithmetic is prone to result in well-defined but buggy code, while in this case also preventing bug-detection tools from being reliable.

That said, you could conceivably implement such semantics in a compiler, which you could enable with some flag, like for example, -fwrapv causes signed overflow to wraparound and -ftrapv causes signed overflow to fail with an exception.

So you could implement a compiler flag which does what you want, today, and get all the benefits that you're proposing.

You could even enable it by default, because the C standard allows the behavior that you're proposing, so you would not be breaking any existing code.

And this would also mean that existing and future C code would still be C-standard compliant (as long as it doesn't rely on that behavior).

But making the C standard require that behavior means that there will be well-defined, standard-compliant code that will rely on those weird semantics when signed overflow occurs, and that's a really bad idea.

> > bug-detection tools couldn't flag signed overflows as invalid

> The standard says `if(x = 5)` is well-defined, but that doesn't stop every competently-designed (non-minimal, correctly configured[0]) compiler from spitting out something to the effect of "error: assignment used as truth value".

The big difference in this case is that such errors are easy to determine at compile-time. No compiler would cause such code to fail at run-time, because it would lead to unexpected and unusual program crashes, which would result in both users and programmers to be mad (especially if the code is correct). But for signed overflows, it's not possible to implement a similar compile-time error.

As another example, AddressSanitizer is competently-designed but as soon as you enable `strict_string_checks` you will run into false positives if your code stores strings by keeping a pointer and a length, rather than forcing them to be NULL-terminated, so that flag can be completely useless (and for my current project, it is).

Which is why I'm guessing it's disabled by default. Which means almost nobody uses that flag.

This happens because strings are not actually required to be NULL-terminated in C, even though most people use them that way. So there is code out there (including mine) that relies on strings not always being NULL terminated, and this has well-defined semantics in C.

But of course, as soon as that happens, then you can't rely on the tool to be useful anymore, because there is perfectly fine code which relies on the well-defined semantics.

Note that in this case, "strict_string_checks" is a run-time check, like detection of signed overflows would have to be.