There's a sushi joke in there somewhere
Moreover, “regulation” is not a synonym of “good and righteous”, especially in the US, where things are quite shady when you look from the outside. FTX was the dear of the regulators, and ended us as a massive scam. The recurrent crises in the banking sector show that regulation is, frankly, quite useless.
Furthermore, the US has a long history of using “regulation” as a way to do financial repression against its population and other countries. Crypto, among all the scams and dubious projects, is one of the last harbingers of financial freedom in a world that gets darker and darker every day on that aspect.
Don't believe me? Well, the day you'll be on the longer end of the stick, you'll understand.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933
But you bring up great points, and that's exactly why we use a political system called a "representative democracy" where if you don't like the laws, you can vote for those that align with your worldview, you can run for office yourself, or you can lobby your politicians to change them.
(Breaking the law is unfortunately not on that list.)
Offering unregistered securities, in apparent violation of the Securities Exchange Act. It's astounding how people think they can skirt the law without even familiarizing themselves with the law.
Car accident related deaths show that seat belts are, frankly, quite useless.
I was immediately banned from the Sushi forums and discord. About 30 days later, it was revealed that Sifu was known fraudster Michael Patryn, and the project imploded.
Sadly, the Sushi leadership has continued to suppress any investigative work by DAO members into the actions of leadership. There is undoubtedly a culture of suppressing information, and receipts suggestive of fraud. The SEC is right to investigate.
It will be funny if the vote reveals the founder has a majority of the tokens and can vote himself these funds from the DAO's treasury. But if the token is well distributed in the DAO and the community surrounding it, and the proposal passes the vote, I don't really see how it is funny. It is just how governance works in a DAO.
Personally, with the lack of details in this proposal I will vote against it, but at this stage it is most likely the kind of input the proposer is expecting, before the actual vote.
Presumably there is some audit trail on expenses after the fact?
/s
Anyone more familiar with the project able to speculate why they’re not including core contributors prior to Sushi 2.0?
___
Surprised core contributors would have publicly identified themselves, since even without any legal liability, to me it puts a huge target on their back given the leverage they have over the project assuming they have ability to commit code that is then distributed to the DAO.
SushiDAO created a legal entity “to reduce liability” and then that entity and an individual associated with it got subpoenaed.
PSA: if there’s an entity, it’s not a Decentralized Autonomous Organization
sushiswap: https://www.sushi.com/
$SUSHI coin: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/sushiswap/
SBF on sushi-swap: https://www.forbes.com/sites/tatianakoffman/2020/09/06/exclu...
SBF the white-knight saved sushi swap https://decrypt.co/41606/the-man-who-saved-sushiswap
I don't completely agree, because a DAO like SushiDAO could lose it's websites and social media accounts, but the total value locked in it's smart contracts would not immediately change. (in the same way as a normal legal entity) These types of contracts are usually governed with their token, which would persist if the legal entity and current developers disappeared. Though, without a way for users to interact with the contract, I would imagine most of the total value locked would move away from the contracts afterwards.
Perplexity is a lot friendlier to crypto in search. https://www.perplexity.ai/search/61e58dba-0ef2-49fb-bc11-bf4...
For responding to a civil subpoena? None.
https://docs.sushi.com/docs/Governance/Current%20Governance%...
> Any use of the devfund wallet requires that the Multisig sign it, which they will only do if it is clearly by the will of the community and has had a passing vote by quorum. There must be at least 4 out of 7 signatures for a transaction to be approved.
> The Multisig members are trusted members of the DeFi & Ethereum ecosystem: @Mable_Jiang, @0xSami_, @nickjrishwain, @0xChop, 0xMaki, @tomlombardi, @DeFi_Ted
> Any changes that are within the purview of the core team, such as rebalancing and administration of farming pools and use of the growth fund, must pass the Operations Multisig with at least 3 signatures.
> The Ops Multisig members are: @MatthewLilley, @0xJiro, @LufyCZ, @sarangprikh22, @chillichelli, @OlaStenberg__
> Our goal is to establish a DAO with working, trustless governance. This is not an easy task by any measure, and is not something that will be rushed. All are welcome to discuss how the future DAO should work, as well as how the current governance model works, by participating on our forums and in the #governance channel of our Discord server.
This is, thereby, not decentralized and autonomous. This is a system where a small handful of people are sitting on a giant pile of cash--one which, AFAIK, is being funded by fees charged on the operating platform--that they promise they are managing on behalf of and at the direction of people who have received what amounts to a share in their organization as part of what is almost certainly an unregistered security offering. That they promise to use direct shareholder voting for as many decisions as possible and have an extremely liquid market for their shares doesn't change this analysis.
Which, to be clear, is entirely different from the situation with, say, Tornado Cash, or any other decentralized system. I'm seeing a number of people here saying "how would they even shut it down?! it's decentralized!"... but, no: the thing this DAO is isn't merely some decentralized contracts. (Hell: I haven't looked yet, but it wouldn't surprise me one iota if there were an obvious kill-switch in even the supposedly-decentralized part of the system that can be tickled by that Operations Multisig.)
