Lake Oroville (in the NYT article) is the 14th largest lake in California, Berryessa is #11. Lake Oroville does hold twice as much water when full though
The big concern is that Winters was flattened by an earthquake in 1892 and the same size quake at a fault near lake Berryessa, which is only 7 miles from the winters, would breach the dam. I've heard it discussed several times in geology circles, there's even a simulation of the result. It goes poorly for winters (7,000 people or so) and Davis (65,000 people). Here's the simulation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEJEHnKrueo
Quite a bit of that area is already water (the Delta), and we've seen during the heavy rains during 2017 (the period the article refers to) how the land around it can take a lot of flooding.
I've driven down the road from the dam to Winters, and the chutes I think would act like a giant water cannon. I wouldn't have high hopes for Winters. Driving down that road, I kept thinking "why would anyone buy real estate here?" - yet people do.
A great portion of the book is devoted to dams. The gist of it is that many dams of questionable utility were constructed throughout the 20th century due to pork barrel politics and the unstoppable bureaucratic engines of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corp of Engineers. Like much infrastructure built in the US, not much concern was given to ongoing maintenance and so the book predicts that this will be a larger concern as time goes on.
Hopefully close calls like Oroville will bring more attention to this issue before a larger disaster happens.
In the long term, California is unprepared and fucked in terms of dwindling water supply and damaging storms and forest fires from climate change. That's why I left.
The problem is it’s also the most currently affected. Mostly due to historic forestry mismanagement (which they’ve corrected but it takes time to make an impact) and the maliciously incompetent behavior of PG&E.
Most of the East Coast is going to be a mess. Same with states near the Gulf. Texas can’t even function now in climate fluctuations without having its grid collapse.
California has its issues, but they’re largely caused over water rights being improperly managed due to unrestrained agricultural usage. Fix that and they have much a ton fewer issues.
USGS sediment research in the San Francisco Bay Area, Santa Barbara Basin, Sacramento Valley, and the Klamath Mountain region found that "megastorms" have occurred in the years: 212, 440, 603, 1029, c. 1300, 1418, 1605, 1750, 1810, and, most recently, 1861–62. Based on the intervals of these known occurrences, ranging from 51 to 426 years, for a historic recurrence of, on average, every 100-200 years
It’s either going to happen tomorrow or 200 years from now, and either way there’s nothing you can do about it except hope you die quickly
If you see hydro reported as safe as nuclear, solar and wind (for example in [3]), then they excluded the largest accident. If hydro is 2 orders of magnitude more deadly than nuclear, wind and solar, then they included everything.
solar 0.02 deaths/TWh
nuclear 0.03
wind 0.04
hydro 0.02 without, 1.5 with
[2] https://ourworldindata.org/safest-sources-of-energy
[3] https://www.energymonitor.ai/sectors/power/weekly-data-fossi...
It was an extreme outlier amongst even major dam failures, and most of the contributing factors are at best distantly related to the technology itself, whilst common to any large and high-risk technical endeavour.
Repeating what I've written before:
[T]he failures largely accrued from institutional hubris, engineering insufficiency, lack of relevant domain knowledge (often deliberate ignorance or denial, see especially Vajont, also St. Francis), poor overall management, lack of disaster preparation, drilling, or readiness, limited resurces or capabilities (especially in developing countries), communications breakdown (see Banqiao's comms loss), and inadequate response in light of imminent or present threat.
None of these are domain-specific to hydraulic civil engineering or absent from nuclear engineering projects.
<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20020553>
And:
The specific failings at Banqiao were virtually all managerial and political, and not technical: poor engineering, inadequate safety provisions, underestimated environmental and operational risks, poor contingency planning, unforeseen perfect storm (literally), severed communications, insufficient warnings, no community disaster preparation, inadequate rescue and recovery. None of these failures are specific to hydro, all apply to nuclear power, and as non-engineering problems there is no technical fix that makes them go away.
In Banqiao, about 25,000 people died in the immediate inundation. Another 150,000 died in the following weeks of starvation and disease. There's no great mystery as to how such deaths are avoided: floodwaters are mitigated by high ground and evacuation centres; starvation and disease by food, water, and medical stocks; and rescue & recovery by trained teams and equipment. Reestablishment of communications, transport, and utilities is critical. These are all basic mitigations and are common to a wide range of foreseeable incidents.
China at the time was desperately poor, politically dysfunctional, institutionally corrupt and inept, and gambled hugely on risk and lost. Other major hydro disasters tend to share these traits.
<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24327114>
The risks from Banqiao were short-term (acute), though profound. They could have been mitigated by planning, preparation, warnings, evacuation, and response. China at the time lacked the safety and civil defence maturity and mindsets, the political will, the engineering culture, and simply the capacity to respond appropriately given the magnitude of the disaster. The deaths were avoidable, and similar threats, say the 2017 Oroville Dam spillway failure. The engineering failure resulted in costs, but no loss of life, nor any significant damage to property other than the dam itself.
The U.S. still does see occasional dam failures, as with the Edenville and Sanford Dam failures of 19 May 2020. Here again poor engineering, construction, and operation created the risk, though again, preparedness and response prevented deaths, though in this case there was significant property damage.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edenville_Dam>
Today, Chernobyl and Fukushima are exclusion zones, and they will be for centuries at a minimum. The reactor cores themselves, for tens of thousands of years. This is far longer than the companies, countries, cultures, and even languages extant at the time of the disasters --- our capacity to address risks and management at this scale is utterly nonexistent. Banqiao today is home to 17 million people who face no ongoing concerns from the incident.
Nuclear power also becomes a threat-multiplier: Chernobyl (and the neighbouring ZaporizhzhiaNuclear Power Station, which had been operating normally prior to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine) have both proved militarily-significant points of leverage in the conflict, with potential impacts extending well beyond the immediate region and time. Yes, dams have also played that role, but the ultimate impacts there are localised in both space and time, as well as highly tangible in ways that radiation threats are not.
Dam failures are short-lasting disasters, occurring over hours, days, or perhaps weeks. Relative to total installations --- tens if not hundreds of thousands worldwide --- major incidents are relatively rare.
Nuclear failures are long-lasting disasters, occurring over decades, centuries, and perhaps millennia. With fewer than 400 nuclear power plants worldwide, we've seen numerous catastrophic failures as well as far more close calls.
This is a topic I've discussed over 30 times on HN, and this comment draws heavily on previous discussion. Earlier instances: <https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&qu...>
actually https://twitter.com/Weather_West
Recently we trekked to see the newly formed Tulare Lake. FWIW, Tulare lake ain't evaporating for another 2 years. Imagine the same size storm repeats for 10+ years.
The Sacramento river, if flooded by say the dam failure of Oroville, could reach Stockton. If that happens the city would be a foot or two underwater.
Little does anyone know there are contingency plans to literally blow the levees along the river and flood the nearby (mostly) farming land.
Counting from a nominal roof top or street level?
Why are we allowing some entity to profit from the upside and lumber us all with the downside costs?
https://www.theonion.com/preemptive-memorial-honors-future-v...
Spoiler alert:
Shockingly, they fixed it a few years later, and got to test it out this year. It apparently worked great.
This discussion was about failing damns or spillways and how to repair them. Solar can fall to strong wether events too and damns provide base grid power.
Its could also be added after construction. A set of pipes of coolant lines and warmed woodslushie that become a temporary solution to a catastrophic development.
Its basically installing a industrial sized ac and a wood slushie sprinkler system.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/flood-dese...
- The devastating 1862 flood the article mentions ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Flood_of_1862 ) extended far beyond California - into British Columbia, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, and Mexico
- With zero major dams available (to fail), the 1862 flood destroyed ~1/4 of all taxable property in California, and killed ~1% of the human population of California. (Today, 1% of that population would be ~400,000 people killed.)
- The 1862 flood is obvious in ocean sediment records, as a thick gray layer. Similar thick layers occur every ~120 years, and one of those is ~10X as thick as the 1862 sediment layer. The NYTimes is very annoyingly short of details here, but I found at least a paywalled version of the sediment research: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00253...
First off, hydrology and specifically excess water management in the valley is often geared toward irrigation and replenishing ground water. We have areas that are suppose to become flooded to keep the pressure off of the earthen levees along the river and delta (created by the confluence of the Sacramento to and San Joaquin rivers) as the water drains into the San Francisco Bay. This gives us a way to slow the discharge of water give it time to soak in join the water table. There are improvements here like widening the river channels we’ve carved out to expose more surface area for it to soak into, but there are no plans for this afaik.
Second, we have a network of creeks, canals, and drainage ditches that move excess water to less harmful places, Dry Creek (which is dry most of the year) was carrying water as it should in march. These provide essential, perennial habitats that were once naturally occurring, and are filled and let dry by design.
Like most new media coverage, with this article being no exception, there is a tendency to focus on the main dams, but in the case of the American River, there are 5 dams in all managing water flow, with a dozen or so more impounding various tributaries. Combined this is known as the Upper American River Project, which acts a extra power capacity that SMUD (Sacramento’s community-owned power company) can turn on quickly. This network holds back nearly 430,000 acre/ft of water. A cascading failure in these dams can cause a significant portion of this (with the total capacity being released as almost 1/2 of Folsom’s capacity) could cause a spillway event and a wall of water careening downstream and potentially rupturing levees that were not rated for this volume. Because of the nature of the river’s bend and the narrowing of distance between the banks, the most obvious spot a break would occur is near Sacramento State University and would fill up the River Park neighborhood instantly given that exists between two levees when a new one was built to restrict the flow of the river so they can build more homes. The floodwaters would make it to downtown, destroying the affluent area of East Sacramento, Midtown, and running south through land park, elmhurst, and oak park. This is just one disaster scenarios that could lead to post-Katrina New Orleans type of flooding, with only hours of warning to execute a poorly planned evacuation.
The upper American River project series of damns is fairly well maintained, but for every Sierra Nevada snowmelt River that drain into then Sacramento or San Joaquin, there is a similar network of dams at varying levels of repair, waiting for a large cascading failure event to give the poor unsuspecting towns in the valley an unfortunate surprise.