Imagine we have four people competing, who each have a max bid of:
Alice: 100, Bob: 150, Charlie: 155, Diana: 180,
In a standard auction bidding would, say, start at 50. When the cost exceeded 100 Alice would drop out, similarly for Bob at 150, and Charlie at 155. So Diana would win and pay 155 (plus maybe one bid-increment, depending on who bid first).
So, if each simply submitted their max bid under the Vikrey auction rules, Diana would win, and pay 155. The whole bidding upwards process can be avoided, which is by some standard more efficient, and everyone pays essentially the same as they would under and English auction.
In this version, you just bid to win and the seller lets you adjust down to that perfect "just barely winning" bid afterwards.
It turns out the seller makes more by everyone bidding to win than they lose by letting the winner adjust their bid after winning.
That's because the 2nd place bid ends up being higher than the winner's used to be.
This means all bidders in the auction have a reason to send an honest bid rather than trying to game the system.
The person "selling" in the auction also has an efficient outcome.
If the bidders collude, they can get a very low price. This is (obviously) true of most auction systems, but for sufficiently public English auctions, bidders that are otherwise uninterested in an item might bid on an item that is going for obviously far below market.
For bidding on jobs (e.g., highway construction) one normally takes the lowest bid, but the lowest bidder will not make any profit and might lose money on the deal, thus putting the project at risk. What might happen in those cases is that corruption takes root and the lowest bidder gets paid more money illegally.
In any case, sealed bid, second price bidding solves the problem by removing the incentive to offer the best price and instead offer the real value.