I don't read that assumption into BoiledCabbage's statement at all: "[..] when we understand it well enough to realize we're the same type of parlor tricks?" This clearly implies a (hypothetical) deeper understanding of processes in the brain and their specific qualities, rather than (as you seem to be implying) a mere comparison of the outputs.

Edit: anyway, the criticism section opens like this:

>Historically, positivism has been criticized for its reductionism, i.e., for contending that all "processes are reducible to physiological, physical or chemical events," "social processes are reducible to relationships between and actions of individuals," and that "biological organisms are reducible to physical systems."

This (at least the 1st and 3rd quoted item, while I think the 2nd one is just out of scope) is exemplary of the kind of things that are obviously true for anyone but a subset of philosophers clinging to magical and unprovable beliefs about the human mind. I asked you to elaborate your argument precisely because if it all boils down to simply rejecting physicalism (in philosophy of mind terms) there's nothing new to argue about. The recurring discussion about "AI can never be like humans" is only interesting when the participants do a little bit more than just staking out their own position in idealism vs dualism vs physicalism terms and regurgitating all the known debates between these camps.