WRT security implications of disabling SIP - I don't think OS becomes any less vulnerable than usual Linux/Windows installation.
is not a good enough argument.
For the story, SIP is Apple's "rootless". Effectively the OS runs with less privileges than root. Disabling SIP significantly increases the attack surface.
That being said, I'm grateful that someone decided to do something more native for containers in macOS.
Is there anything else I should be doing security wise?
I’ve been hearing podman is more secure, but I think it’s still containerd under the hood, so idk how true that is.
On Linux, more or less the entire permissions system makes no assumption about SIP existing (as it doesn't there), so other protections are relied upon to secure the system (such as SELinux, granular directory permissions, etc.).
On both Linux and Windows, TPM and secure boot provide similar protections to SIP on macOS, but are optional (it's encouraged more forcefully on Windows 11).
Removing SIP from a system that relies on it as a basis for platform security is different than using a system that wasn't relying on it in the first place.
This concern is definitely not totally unfounded, back in 2019 Chrome shipped an update that rendered systems with SIP disabled unbootable: https://support.google.com/chrome/thread/15235262?hl=en
In reality they done basically everything to force users to use secure boot. If they disabled normal boot altogether, OS adoption would suffer heavily. They could've obscured that option, but it would be found out, and enterprise users would be pissed at them because they didn't gave them a provisionable way while the way exists. So it came down to normal variables in installer registry.
However modifying, e.g making users "hack" the ISO is really as forceful as it gets without market loss.
Note: There may be more normal way today than modifying the registry of ISO, I installed 11 once when it came out.
Is this related to the code you tried to have merged here: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/8789 ?
Vanilla containerd cannot mount anything on macos.
> If you really want good adoption, you’ll have to figure out a way for devs to try it out without first having to disable SIP.
I can't stress enough how I also would like it to work with SIP enabled!
No matter what you or I think about what's needed for adoption, technical problems get in the way of the tool working with SIP, so seems it's in Apple's ball court really.
Think places where security is a big deal, like finance, military, aerospace, critical infrastructure etc.
This is not an alternative to remotely connecting to a VM to control Linux containers (which DfM is)
They did not have such success on windows, despite Windows also having a container subsystem, as windows servers already did this with IIS web app containerization.
On MacOS desktop software distribution is largely a solved problem since ages. On MacOS/Darwin servers... are there such in industrial use apart from some research installations?
Sure it does not attempt to map fsevents<->inotify 1:1 but honestly I can live with that limitation given that it's a 10x performance increase compared to the DfM kitchensink.
I do go native darwin when I can / it makes sense.
Can you say anything more about what you did instead, and how it ended up working out?
Maybe for an automated test CI/CD running system (which is probably the main use-case), but not on anything that users would interact with.
That's a technical limitation.
If it really isn’t technically possible (which I think you might be able to do in a Darwin VM), then maybe this approach isn’t a good idea.
A modern Linux with SELinux enabled (the default in e.g. Fedora) running apps inside rootless containers (Podman doesn’t even need a daemon) is likely much more secure than your default MacOS or Windows.
Where SELinux really shines is in server installs.
A decade ago SIP didn't exist at all. I thought disabling SIP just put us back to how things were in Yosemite. What changed?