You are more concerned with someone opening your iPhone and putting a replacement malicious part than with someone pwning your iPhone with a $5 wireless device while in his car just driving by ?
Your threat model is upside down.
Also note that I specified I'm more concerned with verification of trusted hardware on my own device. Because the repercussions of malicious hardware implanted in my own device cannot be mitigated purely in software. Whereas verifying the integrity of an external device inherently depends solely on software, since there is no hardware interaction. I'm still concerned about it, in the sense that I'd like my OS to take best efforts to only "trust" external devices insofar as it can verify they're trustable, but I also accept that those devices are outside of my control and so any protocol for trusting them will have holes in it. My main requirement is that I should be able to opt out of the system if possible (by e.g. disabling bluetooth).
Bullshit.
Flooding the waves with radio interference (something that Bluetooth is particularly resistant to) would at most "deny service" of another device trying to connect to my iPhone through Bluetooth. It should NOT deny service of the _entire_ iPhone, which is what is discussed here. This is 100% preventable crap.
> the (arguably) fundamentally impossible task of verifying an external device is a "real" Apple device
Bullshit... and egregious considering you apparently think it is doable for replacement parts, but "fundamentally impossible" for networking devices. SSL is about 30 years old by now.
> I'm still concerned about it, in the sense that I'd like my OS to take best efforts to only "trust" external devices insofar as it can verify they're trustable, but I also accept that those devices are outside of my control and so any protocol for trusting them will have holes in it.
Also bullshit. All these holes are because of the proprietary extensions Apple puts on top of Bluetooth, which are exploited to no end. Notice my original post is about Apple not being able to identify when it is a (real vs fake) Apple device that is trying to initiate a connection. The protocol is 100% controlled by Apple.
Normal Bluetooth protocols and devices (which do not identify as Apple devices and are therefore subject to the standard Bluetooth pairing UI) are almost never the problem.
It also does not qualify as "pwning" your device, at least for my interpretation of the word "pwn."
