Consider that, I want to be able to use a regular android OS, but I don't completely trust it, either its purposely malicious or just accidently going to leak info. So isolation is good in this case, its much easier to audit the mechanism of isolation rather than the whole OS.

The problem with DRM and "trusted computing" part is that it's under someone else's control, some central authority etc. From my reading of the docs on this, this is not the case with pVM, from https://source.android.com/docs/core/virtualization/security

> Data is tied to instances of a pVM, and secure boot ensures that access to an instance’s data can be controlled

> When a device is unlocked with fastboot oem unlock, user data is wiped.

> Once unlocked, the owner of the device is free to reflash partitions that are usually protected by verified boot, including partitions containing the pKVM implementation. Therefore, pKVM on an unlocked device won't be trusted to uphold the security model.

So my reading of this is that that it is under the users control, as long as they have the ability to unlock the bootloader, and reflash the device with their own images.

I'd love someone who is more knowledgeable to weigh in, but this tech, to me, doesn't seem that close to TPM/DRM type chips where there is no possibility of user control.