What's meant by heuristics is some times unclear. I wonder if by heuristics you mean a shortcut. In CS and AI our model of a shortcut is the heuristic cost functions in heuristic search algorithms like A* and its variants.

It's interesting because I've thought along the following lines. A* is a pathfinding algorithm so it's a natural choice for path planning -the process of planning a path through some environment for an autonomous agent to follow. The funny thing is, as it turns out, pathfinding can be abstracted as finding a "path" through a graph: a set of nodes connected by edges; and that's a great abstraction for general task planning - the task of achieving any arbitrary objective - so A* is also widely used for task planning.

Well, isn't path planning an almost universal ability of intelligent animals? Most animals are motile for some part of their lives and they seem to use their intelligence at the very least to navigate their environment. So is it that far-fetched to think that an ancestral ability for path planning, essentially identical to a heuristic search algorithm like A*, evolved into general intelligence? And wouldn't that mean that general intelligence can be, ultimately, modeled as some kind of heuristic search?

The answer I think is: no, and that's a dangerous way to think. A model is a model, it's not the process it models. And I think that's my fundamental disagreement with lisper, disregarding my confusion about the meaning of "kinematics".

> Yeah, I was actually thinking of kinematics as in classical mechanics. I think you were speaking about kinematic equations as in robotics.

What do you see as the relevant difference?

> I think it's easier than calculating the trajectory of an object, let alone many at once

Well, yeah, but there isn't anything fundamentally more difficult about juggling. It all boils down to Newton's laws.

My point is that there are two different ways that human brains can apply Newton's laws. We can do it intuitively, without even being consciously aware of Newton's laws, which is why humans were able to throw and catch objects before 1687. Or we can do it consciously by manipulating symbolic representations of the equations of motion. Those two activities are in some sense equivalent because they both involve producing a model of a physical system in our brains and using that model to make accurate predictions about that system. But they are also obviously radically different in other ways, and being skilled at one in now way implies being skilled at the other.