It happens to me very regularly that a password in my password manager is needed on a different domain. Maybe the logon process is at id.domain.com and password is pinned to domain.com, or maybe the password was created at signup.domain.com and so it doesn't pop up on domain.com, or you have to log in to a hotel's site with the password from their reward scheme (different domain), etc...

In any case users are trained by the internet to need to search for the right password outside the pinned domains. Most of the time I guarantee people don't add the extra domains to the password records. So when a phishing site pops up they'll do the same: search for the site name/domain that they think they're logging into and go from there.

Password managers solve password reuse, weak passwords, etc. but IMO do not solve phishing, especially not for the kind of user who's most susceptible t it (little technical understand, hates this stuff, just wants to follow instructions and not deal with it), but passkeys might.

There can be vulnerabilities, this is clearly the hottest attack surface of password managers. I remember a few years ago Tavis Ormandy from Google Project Zero found such vulnerabilities in a bunch of the most popular password managers which allowed to steal credentials from a rogue website.

I'd still recommend using a password manager, as overall and in practice the risk of phishing and (re)using (weak) passwords is far greater than this kind of rare vulnerabilities (and also I work for a company that makes a password manager ^^)

See https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/passmgrs.html if you'd like to know more

The metaphor might be a bit esoteric, but that's similar to wishing that Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) allowed you "get your <private keys>" out of the HSM. As sibling comment says, that's how you get phished. The whole point of an HSM (and a passkey) is that the super-secret private part never leaves the HSM no matter how nicely you ask and no matter how compromised the machine is.

A password manager, OTOH, is happy to hand out your private key ("password" in this case) to anyone that has access to it.

It's not that kind of impossible. It means that even if you are tricked into giving your passkey to the attacker, it's cryptographically useless to the attacker because a passkey is bound to a specific origin.

Because that opens you up for being phished.