Allegedly canadian intelligence knew this, but had it all marked "for canadian eyes only" because they were worried about consequences if usa found out they weren't on board. I highly doubt canada has super-spies, the problem is usa really wanted there to be WMDs, so they came to the conclusion there was.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-intelligence-asses...
Everyone following the news knew at the time the US & UK couldn't direct the inspectors to the WMDs, because no WMDs existed.
This from the article is false. The CIA never concluded that Iraq had a nuclear program.
In fact, the CIA was ignored when they refuted the politician's claims about the nuclear program.
It appears as though several countries were happily selling Iraq WMD components and materials. Including the US.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_chemical_weapons_program.... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destr...
Maybe if they were as influential as the CIA they would get a ton of political pressure to throw out their analysis and echo the current administration’s foregone conclusions?
Also, while I am not anywhere familiar with them enough to know their overall track record, even if they did correctly predict the topics listed in the article 'correct', that is three items in 60 years? I'd be curious to know how their intelligence has compared with the numerous things inbetween. That would be a huge lift though.
Still fun/interesting to learn about these agencies, even as someone who grew up in the US and took higher level classes on US Government, you never really get a complete view everything.
That seems like lesson MBAs should take to heart.
Case in point: where in the article is the INR's brilliant prediction about the future of the war in Ukraine?
TBH the article makes it clear they are not perfect, by mentioning that they got Iran badly wrong.
Maybe the INR doesn't reveal predictions of that nature to the public or media?
Not sure this could have been predicted from the Iraq war though unless you are talking about the general prediction that any rebel group that the U.S. sponsors turns into a terrorist group that the U.S. bombs within a decade. Its kinda of funny when you compare news articles across years.
When thinking about this it's very important to recognize what this means exactly. The money is not put on a pile and set on fire. It goes somewhere where it has very significant impact, most likely flowing into military-industrial complex which is a huge chunk of domestic economy.
In a small way, it kind of was. We used the money to produce weapons and ammunition. The producers took the cash and provided the arms. In an ideal economy, both sides would have a net gain: the producers reap profits, and the military uses the goods for a goal it (supposedly) believes is more valuable than the money spent.
But we shot the ammo, used the rifles, and detonated the bombs. And the USA didn't achieve the valuable goals it promised. So, while the arms manufacturers came out ahead, the military was left with little value. If they had put that money into research or upgrading bases overseas, then there'd be civilian profits and nice things the military could use for years.
> The INR director saw the counterinsurgency effort's emphasis on military security as insufficient. Hilsman was much more receptive to ideas for population resettlement and control along lines advanced by Robert G. Thompson, a British consultant to the Diem government, and adopted them as his own. Kennedy asked Hilsman to prepare a paper showing how this concept could work.
You're going to get one eventually that went on a lucky streak and guessed several international developments in a row.
What about other non-war events? Does INR also do better in that regard?
But as people set goals the work at a certain place, people lesser-qualified slowly join the ranks until the place is a shell of what it used to be, made up of posers.
Can't let the truly skilled individuals do great work either, otherwise it'll expose the unskilled individuals' lack-of-purpose in that place, so bureaucracy gets built and gets in the way of everybody trying to do real work.
Who would have thought removing top-down agendas and starting with a bottom-up approach would end up with a better picture of the truth!
In 1973 there was the Paris Peace Accords that crystallized (Communist) North Vietnam and (non-communist) South Vietnam, just like the two Koreas. Then in 1975 the north invaded:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_spring_offensive
and the US (military) basically did nothing to help the south.
Kind of like Afghanistan more recently: as long as the US had an interest in it the Taliban could not "win", but the US simply concluded that they didn't want to be involved any longer and pulled out.
If the US had continued support and presence, like with South Korea, would it have been possible that South Vietnam would still be around? Bothering with (South) Vietnam wasn't of strategic importance (?) any more, and so the US pulled out and let the chips fall where they may. If the US had continued to care about Vietnam strategically, could they have continued to make tactical (military) decisions to support the south?
This is just what losing looks like in that situation. Yes, we lost.
Did Germany lose world war 1 or did they just decide to stop bothering with it? I think the answer is clearly the former, but in the end they still kept an independent state, weren't occupied, etc.
The point of war isn't neccesarily to have your opponent destroyed, just to have them yield to your political objectives. If you give up on all your objectives , and grant your opponent everything they want, that is a loss.
It's doubtful that the US could've continued to keep troops in Vietnam.
By the time (1973) the Paris Peace Accords happened, there was little US domestic support in the public, in business leaders, or in Congress. US troops hadn't done any major offensives for years, in order to keep casualties low.
By 1970, within the US Army in Vietnam, there was an level of mutiny, with entire units refusing to go on missions, officers and NCOs getting fragged (murdered) if they sent troops on missions felt to be too dangerous or pointless. The US strategy was one of attrition, and they simply couldn't continue. The Vietnamese were going to kick the foreigners out and re-unite the country, no matter how long it took.
For the whole war, the NVA / Viet Cong - largely held the initiative - around 85% of the time from '65 to '68' and then around 75% afterwards, they could choose when, and if to engage US troops and thus control their casualties to a certain extent. Once engaged, the US could bring massive firepower, but it required grunts as bait to go searching for ambushes, in addition to the constant threat of mines and booby-traps.
Bears repeating. This was true of a lot of "anti-communist" US actions: propping up a hated local elite who were in no way democratic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem
There was also great turmoil in the U.S. at the time (as we remember with the approaching DNC convention in Chicago). Nixon implemented an effort to distance the U.S. from the situation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnamization
Watergate closed the door on efforts to maintain South Vietnam.
I do not fully understand the backstory, but the Vienamese seem to have done OK out of the "Communist" victory. It's a very different place from North Korea.
Alternate counterfactual: is there a route through history where https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiphong_incident does not take place and a peaceful, unified Vietnam exists from the end of WW2 onwards?
They have largely followed the Chinese model of economic development, via a policy of Đổi Mới[0][1] adopted in 1986 and has since continued with various reforms in the 1990s as well. This is persistent today in how Vietnamese economic policy is driven, as far as I can tell
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%90%E1%BB%95i_M%E1%BB%9Bi
[1]: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2008-84.pdf
Really, the US is all about the under dog fighting for independence, isn't that the US Mythos? We should have been rooting for the Vietnamese, not bombing them.
I think it all depends on (a) what was our desired outcome, and (b) did it come to pass? If we didn't achieve our desired outcome, then we lost.
