Rules restricting the range of passwords that may be used in an arbitrary fashion can markedly decrease the search space for an attacker.
A strict rule count by itself is neither good nor bad. Well, arguably, it's bad, as it increases system complexity, side effects, loopholes, and trains users to thwart restrictions. Ideally you want a small number of sane rules (mostly based on role and access), tightly implemented, with strong auditability.
Going back to passwords: the simple check of denying the use of any known password (there are collections of millions now from various site compromises) would be an audit check, not strictly a rule, though it might result in a rule of "known passwords will be denied".
The advantage of this, of course, is platform flexibility. The disadvantage is inconsistent app behavior (battery is drained by background apps).
For instance, I can be very strict about PDFs on your computer: no PDF allowed. If you have addressed the risks posed by other more vulnerable attack vectors, OK, then my rule reduces the uncertainty of less strict but more complicated rules that would address the vulnerabilities of PDF readers. Otherwise, for example if I'm allowing the auto-execution of apps on removable devices, my strict PDF rules don't increase security.