> The flaw affects RHEL9 as the regression was introduced after the OpenSSH version shipped with RHEL8 was published.
$ ps ax | grep sshd | head -1
1306 ? Ss 0:01 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -D [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
As mentioned elsewhere here, is -D sufficient to avoid exploitation, or is -e necessary as well? $ man sshd | sed -n '/ -[De]/,/^$/p'
-D When this option is specified, sshd will not
detach and does not become a daemon. This
allows easy monitoring of sshd.
-e Write debug logs to standard error instead
of the system log.
RHEL9 is also 64-bit only, and we see from the notice:"we have started to work on an amd64 exploit, which is much harder because of the stronger ASLR."
On top of writing the exploit to target 32-bit environments, this also requires a DSA key that implements multiple calls to free().
There is a section on "Rocky Linux 9" near the end of the linked advisory where unsuccessful exploit attempts are discussed.
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ss...
sshd.c handles no_daemon (-D) and log_stderr (-e) independently. log_stderr is what is given to log_init in log.c that gates the call to syslog functions. There is a special case to set log_stderr to true if debug_flag (-d) is set, but nothing for no_daemon.
I can't test it right now though so I may be missing something.
openssh-8.7p1-38.0.2.el9.x86_64.rpm
openssh-server-8.7p1-38.0.2.el9.x86_64.rpm
openssh-clients-8.7p1-38.0.2.el9.x86_64.rpm
The changelog addresses the CVE directly. It does not appear that adding the -e directive is necessary with this patch. $ rpm -q --changelog openssh-server | head -3
* Wed Jun 26 2024 Alex Burmashev <alexander.burmashev@oracle.com> - 8.7p1-38.0.2
- Restore dropped earlier ifdef condition for safe _exit(1) call in sshsigdie() [Orabug: 36783468]
Resolves CVE-2024-6387https://rockylinux.org/news/2024-07-01-rocky-linux-9-cve-202...