Consequently pressure to support more effective DRM will always translate into pressure to restrict what users can do with their devices.
Furthermore, the only defense against this is large open device market share: once closed devices comprise most of the market, DRM proponents can announce they'll stop supporting open devices, creating a downward spiral that further decreases the availability of open devices.
And then we live in a future that's fucked.
This is exactly my problem. Before ideas like this surfaced, the demarcation line between who controls what was purely based on ownership. The machine that I own acts only on my behalf and in my best interests, the server that you own does so for you (or atleast for PCs this has always been the case)
TPMs, attested bootchains and whatnot trample on this whole concept. It's like your very own hardware now comes with a built in Stasi agent that reports on your conduct whether you like it or not. It bothers me on a visceral level and I'm constantly wondering if it's just me.
Attestation is just a tool. It can be used for all kinds of things and doesn't privilege one side or another. The average app developer doesn't truly care what device you use, they just want to cut out abuse and fraud, which are real problems that do require effective solutions.
Ultimately, trade requires some certainty that both sides will act as they promise to act. Attestation is more important for individuals attesting to companies because individuals have so many more ways to hold companies to account if they break their agreements than technology, like the legal system, which is largely ineffective at enforcing rules against individuals due to cost.
Almost complete disagree on TPMs. A better comparison than a spy would probably be a consulate (ok, maybe an idealized one, located underground in a Faraday cage): Their staff doesn't get to spy on you, but if you ever do want to do business with companies in that country and need some letters notarized/certified, walking into their consulate in your capital sure beats sending trustworthy couriers around the world every single time.
To torture that analogy some more: Sure, the guest country could try to extend the consulate into a spy base if you're not careful, and some suspicion is very well warranted, but that possibility is not intrinsic to its function, only to its implementation.
It's not just you.
It disgusts me so deeply I wish computers had never been invented. A wonderful technology with infinite potential, capable of reshaping the world. Reduced to this sorry state just to protect vested interests. They used to empower us. Now they are the tools of our oppression.
I think it's fair to assume that in a world in which almost every device supports attestation and makes it available to any service provider by default, without giving users an informed choice to say no or even informing them at all, service providers are much more likely to provide access exclusively to attestation-capable clients.
That, in turn, has obvious negative consequences for users with devices not supporting attestation (whether out of ideological choice, because it's a low cost device and the manufacturer can't afford the required audits and security guarantees etc.): Sure, these users will always be able to just refuse to transact with any service provider requiring attestation.
But think that through: We're not only talking about Netflix here. At what availability rates of attestation will decision makers at financial institutions decide that x% is good enough and exclude everybody else from online banking? What about e-signing contracts for doing business online? What about e-government services?
I am at the same time excited about the new possibilities attestation offers to users (in that they will be able to do things digitally that just weren't economically feasible for service providers, since they often have to cover the risks of doing so) as I am very wary of the negative externalities of a world in which attestation is just a bit too easy and ubiquitous.
In other words, the ideal amount of general purpose attestation availability is probably high, but significantly below 100% (or, put differently, the ideal amount of friction is non-zero). Heterogeneity of attestation providers can probably help a bit, but I'm wary of the inherent centralizing forces due to the technical and economical pragmatics of trusted computing.
When it comes to financial or legal matters (and this includes online banking) a small dedicated hardware element for signing fingerprints is all that's ever been required. Anything more is an overreach.
It doesn't matter. Those devices fail hardware remote attestation.
> Some remote servers won't give you service if you do that, but nothing is locking you out of your device.
The device's purpose is to be used. If it can't be used without giving up things like banks and private communications, it won't be used.
Device is not locked, it just turns into a paperweight if you actually unlock it.
> As Android dominates the global market, you already live in that world where most devices are open.
Wanna know what else dominates the global market? WhatsApp. In many regions of the world, without their services, you are ostracized.
Marriott (the hotel brand) shipped a release of their Android app that refused to run on unlocked devices.
It probably didn't impact the majority of (locked) Android devices, so why would Marriott care?
And with one app update, a valid user configuration became less capable.
I just installed KDE Connect, and an open source keyboard. Banking apps refuse to run because of those (because my keyboard might see my keystrokes!!!). They don't even need a failed hardware attestation to refuse you service.
So even if you don't try to modify your device, your device might still end up like half a paperweight. I either can't do banking, or I can't use the functionality I want.
