The protester's guide to smartphone security (opens in new tab)

On iOS there are not many options for P2P w/o Internet (I assume that is what you meant - otherwise if you want P2P over Internet then there are some options although not really "truly" P2P of course - and of course if Internet is shut down or overwhelmed then it will be down). There's https://github.com/berty/berty (the last time I tried it was crashing incessantly but it might have improved). I do not know of anything else really (there might be few but I am not sure).

So yeah, they'd be able to say that "person A was at location B and later C", but not necessarily the way there or after/before those specific locations.

I agree that the safest is to assume they can definitely track you no matter what protocol/antenna you use, so you have to chose what moment it's OK to be tracked (like large groups).

As a denial of service attack?

True. But keep in mind that demonstration size can have an impact.

Even just relatively large, not even a Million Man March.

For example, relevant to recent news magnifying vile Nazi-saluting imbecile demographics: They tried to pull that at an event in Boston in 2017, but tens of thousands of counter-demonstrators showed up. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Free_Speech_Rally

We need more reminders that the US can be good people.

But yeah, in general if you take a phone just assume it's tracking you or at least making it possible for those with access to know you where there.

They're far dumber than most people give them credit, unless you off a rich guy they just don't have the resources to even think about penetrating anything but cell networks.

The encryption is pretty good, they're not likely to break it any time soon. The device MACs are whatever, unless you go to protests then go wandering around an urban area with the same radios for an extended period of time they're not going to do shit about it. They would have to geolocate from the RF emission and that's difficult to do to an accuracy necessary to uniquely identify you. Further, LoRa is still a bit of a pain to work with outside of using vendor chips which don't have non-cooperative DF capability so we're in the realm of expensive custom solutions from an RF shop which is far more money than the feds are willing to spend to dragnet a couple people.

If you just want to talk to a few friends, don't bother with the default public mesh config, setup your own with encryption enabled.

Don't use longfast, use a higher speed setting if possible. Longfast will go 10km+ in optimal conditions and in a city environment, won't go any further than medfast.

Don't use the default radio channel, pick another one.

MAKE SURE ALL SYSTEMS ARE CONFIGURED IDENTICALLY - meshtastic is picky about all the radio settings being the same for bits to go through. It cannot figure out that the sender is using a faster/slower bitrate than you are so you will just get nothing. Do not attempt to use them until you've verified that all systems reliably send and receive messages in an uncontested environment. It's very easy to misconfigure meshtastic but once you do, fixing it in the field is going to be very difficult.

I mean, that’s kind of a given even for the protests that are legitimate. They really only happen when people reach a point of no return, and the organizers are more likely to be fanatics in the first place.

You just don't even want to be at the "proving intent" stage.

If you had a function/service that just automatically wiped your device at intervals, regardless of where you were and what you were doing, that might be more defensible than wiping manually.

Best is if your device can't be locked and doesn't have any evidence of anything at all.

In contrast, "the device opened in response to the same fingerprint/face that the suspect has" is a form of world-evidence which doesn't infringe on your mind, much like "the key found in your pocket unlocked the safe."

If you're not technical, signal is hands down the best solution.

If you have a group that's going to something and you are willing to take some extra steps, something like matrix/briar/simplex/whatever setup with a self hosted instance provides you with the knowledge that all the infrastructure is under your control and that the feds just aren't going to have the time to sit down and figure out how this shit works.

The thing this thread is wildly missing the point on is unless you off a ceo or are a prolific organizer, the feds are systematic. They pick a set of techniques and technologies that cast the widest net possible with the money they have, then spend their time trying to nail people within that venn diagram. Yes, security through obscurity is not ideal in-and-of-itself, but combined with encryption and chaos, you can get much farther than using the same stuff everyone else has been using for a decade+. If you stay near the leading edge of tech the feds are a decade behind you, they still have years of threat briefing powerpoints to sit through before they can even think about implementing a countermeasure.

You could find 1000 CVEs in briar but if only a handful of of people at a demonstration are using it, the feds are still going to be sitting there beating their heads against signal because that's what they know how to do. If they ever find a single high severity CVE in signal, it's game over for everyone.

(On the other hand, you’re also right that agent provocateurs are old COINTELPRO-era tactics used by the state and right wingers against protest movements.)

When it comes to tactics to keep yourself safe when protesting, there aren’t ultimately too many hard beliefs to be had, especially when the right are perfectly happy to collaborate with the state.

Maybe you’d argue that the second set of protesters are actually feds; I won’t argue the point because I prefer the first set of norms myself.

The Jan 6 insurrection is a good example of how difficult it is in a real world scenario to ID specific people in a large protest, and many of them got caught because they talked about it afterward on Facebook. If you are cell phone 2,347 on a spreadsheet of 33,422 phones and the number has no associated locational data, open source information, etc. you are way safer than bringing your regular phone, while not being an easy target and being able to communicate if you need to.

For a phone that was off until 2 hours ago and it's only login is the app they comm with, there don't seem to be a lot of meaningful risk vectors.

> and can be trivially unlocked to extract all relevant information.

The unlocker will maybe get one app login and 2 hours of location data.

> if you're using it to coordinate the protest that's plenty of incriminating evidence for the police.

It's one app login and 2 hours of location data. Most of that same info can be gleaned by directly observing the individual.

People can agree on what the law is, but they don't always agree on what is right. Sometimes a democratic government will zealously defend a law, war or principal that later generations of the same government will disavow.