Javas focus has shifted multiple times through history and at least starting with it becoming generally available hasn't really been a single purpose thing, so I don't think this is really making any difference in the argument.

But I could have formulated some thing better:

> sand boxing being secondary

sand boxing for _security_ being secondary, for compatibility it was primary (e.g. like flatpack) and even if it wasn't what was seen as acceptable security for the 90th isn't anywhere close to it for today in most cases

Also "tight system integration" was in context of "highly sandboxes" things, which isn't necessary quite the same. E.g. in context of "highly sandboxes" things rusts standard library and support for C-API libraries is tightly system integrated. But if you speaking in a context of e.g. windows you need to add the official bindings to the various MS specific system libraries to count as "tightly integrated" and even then you could argue it's not quite there due to not having first class COM support.

Anyway I think the most important takeaway form Java sandbox security is "never run the code enforcing your sandbox as part of the inside of your sandbox" because a huge amount of security issues can be traced back to that (followed by the way Java applets have been embedded in the browser wrt. "privileged" applets being really really bad designed in a ton of ways).