So you obviously disagree with the 2021 ruling of the court, and subsequently 2024 ruling which denied Israel‘s appeal to that ruling, thus reaffirming jurisdiction. That is fine. That verdict has not gone without criticism. But it is ultimately irrelevant the court’s interpretation of the Rome Statute, and Palestinian statehood is that the ICC does have jurisdiction over Gaza. In particular the verdict did not claim that Hamas needed to accept the jurisdiction.

Now I’m not very good at reading legal documents, but from what I can gather, the court determined that it “is not constitutionally competent to determine matters of statehood that would bind the international community.” ([1] para. 108) and that it did not want to resolve border disputes (para. 113 and para. 115). Rather the court based its ruling on the right of self determination and the Palestinian right to their own state (para. 116). For this they used internationally recognized borders which were defined in other UN resolutions.

I guess you can point out the colonial nature of such a ruling, that this in effect allows some groups to determine the rights of separate groups as long as the former is internationally recognized, but not the latter. I‘m not gonna argue for how just this system is, but this is consistent with international law, as argued by justices of the ICC, on at least two separate rulings. For better or worse, this is how international law works.

As for the partially dissenting opinion[2] as I understand it—again, I‘m not good at reading these things—disagreed that the court couldn’t determine Palestinian statehood, and argued that the Oslo accords gave Palestine their statehood, and the court derived their jurisdiction from that. This ends up being the exact same territory.

1: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2...

2: https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RelatedRecords/C...