https://github.com/tvondra/jwt_context/blob/10be23c0651f1099...
https://github.com/tvondra/jwt_context/blob/10be23c0651f1099...
Oh look, the typical setup for a classical JWT vulnerability.
Prior art:
https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-...
https://github.com/firebase/php-jwt/issues/351
You should really consider not using JWT for new designs that don't a priori need to interop with JWT.
PASETO is less likely to create sadness: https://paseto.io
The correct fix is to never trust the header for which algorithm you're using.
If you're trying to make the argument that because they can be insecure, we should not use JWTs. Thats not really a great argument for most people. JWTs provide a lot of value, and the idea of having some secure, validatable, and no network required check for authentication, or transporting information. Is too valuable for businesses. So we all use JWTs, they are a decent standard.
At the very least you should propose an alternative that people use besides JWTs if you're going to vaugly hand wave about the scary security issues of 2021 firebase, and 2020 Npm packages reported by Auth0.
PASETO: https://paseto.io
I thought this was common knowledge on HN?
> if you're going to vaugly hand wave about the scary security issues of 2021 firebase, and 2020 Npm packages reported by Auth0.
These are issues caused by the JWT standard.
https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-ba...
The general idea is that the connection pool ingress is trusted to provide the context properly, but the client is not. The pool would generate a random JWK for each connection and each request would use a newly signed JWT and the token ID is strictly monotonic, which makes any attempts for the client to smuggle their own token contexts in near impossible.
The JWTs the pool signs for each transaction will contain the claims that were correctly validated from the client.
A `DISCARD ALL` before returning the connection to the available pool will clear the context so it cannot be re-used and a new context must be provided fresh.
The application supplied a session token when first querying the database. The database would make a call to the authentication server to verify it and obtain the roles associated with that session. If it had not seen that combination of roles before, it would build and cache access tables for them (needed for performance when using views for row level security). Then any further queries using that token were fast. This also worked with connection pooling.
It had some rough edges; we had to run periodic cleanup jobs to remove stale cached access tables and tokens. And even with them, enforcing row level security consumed about 30% of the database server performance!
But, it did work and remained in service for about 7 years. Eventually, they replaced it with something much simpler. I had left and nobody understood it anymore. Which I guess is a separate issue about doing unusual things with tech...
As a suggestion I would look to name the properties of your current token in such a way where they could be compatible with the embedded case.
