That's already here. Even random aliexpress tablets support widevine L1 (ie. highest security level)
They own the os, with sign-in, integrity checks, and the inability to install anything on it Google doesn't want you to install they could make it pretty much impossible to view the videos on a device capable of capturing them for the vast majority of people. Combine that with a generation raised in sandboxes and their content would be safe.
Of course, the same can be said for FB, Tiktok, instagram, Pintrest, reddit, ... and I'm sure the list keeps going. Frankly, Youtube is pretty damn good about this, really.
Google owns that monopoly.
Camera manufacturers can easily refuse to record a stream of they detect it is protected, may be via watermarks or other sidechannel.
You might be thinking of Macrovision, which was integrated in a lot of DVD players and would embed pulses into the vertical blanking interval of the analogy video output. These pulses could be detected by compliant DVD recorders and used to refuse recording. The pulses would also cause playback defects in some older VCRs and TVs.
I remember connecting my first DVD player to an old TV via a VCR (effectively using the VCR as an RF modulator) and being plagued with the image brightness constantly lowering and rising. At the time, I fixed this by switching to a dedicated RF modulator. I now suspect Macrovision is what caused this.
> "the technical means through which WEI will accomplish its ends is relatively simple. Before serving a web page, a server can ask a third-party "verification" service to make sure that the user's browsing environment has not been "tampered" with. A translation of the policy's terminology will help us here: this Google-owned server will be asked to make sure that the browser does not deviate in any way from Google's accepted browser configuration" [1]
https://www.fsf.org/blogs/community/web-environment-integrit...
We'll eventually be able to reverse-engineer that and run it programmatically, but it will take a long time.
And when they catch you doing so, they'll ban your (personalized) encryption key so you'll just have to buy another graphics card to get another key.
This is how it already works, not some future thing. But the licensing fees make it so it only gets used for Hollywood-level movies.
The decryption code could verify that it's only providing decrypted content to an attested-legitimate monitor, using DRM over HDMI (HDCP).
You might try to modify the decryption code to disable the part where it reencrypts the data for the monitor, but it might be heavily obfuscated.
Maybe the decryption key is only provided to a TPM that can attest its legitimacy. Then you would need a hardware vulnerability to crack it.
Maybe the server could provide a datastream that's fed directly to the monitor and decrypted there, without any decryption happening on the computer. Then of course the reverse engineering would target the monitor instead of the code on the computer. The monitor would be a less easily accessible reverse engineering target, and it itself could employ obfuscation and a TPM.
TPM is Mathematically Secure and you can't extract what's put in. See, Fritz-Chip.
I guess that isn't quite enough to prevent screen recording but these devices also support DRM which does this.