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0 pointsalephnerd3mo ago0 comments

> There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly

Not really. Most of them offer significant carve-outs for American BigTech companies, or their implementation has been stayed, or significant capex subsidizes are provided to help reduce their impact for American BigTechs considering FDI in those countries.

It has been a DNC supported policy [0] as well to put pressure on countries that are even considering a digital services act. Heck the Biden admin began the process of making a legal example out of Canada [1] as a warning shot to other countries considering such options.

> To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff ... purely a "negotiation tool".

That is what import taxes and tariffs are when not clubbed with subsidizes and formal sector specific industrial policy, because the act of giving MFN status to certain nations is itself a negotiating tactic. Canada's backing down on a digital service tax is a good example of that [2]

The whole point of (eg.) giving the UK preferential market access to the US over the EU, and giving Japan and South Korea preferential market access to the US over China is because it is a lever we can use when negotiating. Heck, France and Germany have both constantly tried leveraging tariffs and import taxes as a negotiating tactic against the US under the Biden admin [3][4] (and of course earlier).

As I mentioned above, this has been a slow-rolling negotiation between the US and EU since 2019. We in the US have bipartisan support to oppose the DSA and DSA-equivalents abroad. It was prominent stance in the Biden administration [0], and even Harris would have put a similar degree of pressure on the EU.

We have no obligation to give Europeans a red carpet, and you guys are not in a position to push back anyhow. The Chinese [5] and Russians have given similar ultimatums to the EU as well. What are you going to do? Sign an FTA with India and then face the same problem in 10 years with them?

You guys have fallen into the same trap that the Mughal and Qing Empires fell into in the 18th-19th century. Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.

[0] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[1] - https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-...

[2] - https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2025/06/can...

[3] - https://www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-find-grou...

[4] - https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/real-reason...

[5] - https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/ch...

[6] - https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-sets-2...

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sofixa3mo ago

You're still not explaining how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR. It's a new legal framewo tackling a relatively new set of problems. If any of them get watered down because of deals with the US, then you could make that sort of claim.

> Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.

Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent. The only major exception is the F-35, but at least one 6th gen European jet is in the works, and unless fighting with the US, an 5th gen stealth fighter isn't really that needed. European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.

alephnerdOP3mo ago

> Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent.

That might happen over the long term (I still have doubts given that whenever a joint EU project is formed between two countries with vendors, they inevitabely end up collapsing due to domestic political considerations such as the European MBT and FCAS - no leader wants to be the leader who shut down a factory with 1200 high paying unionized jobs for the greater good), but cannot happen in the 1 year timeframe given.

The reality is, if we the US make a deal with Russia over the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the next 12 months, the EU will have no choice but to accept it if you do not put boots on the ground and if you do not expropriate Russian government assets in the EU. But your leadership class has rejected [2] both [3].

> European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.

Not enough for the 1 year time frame needed

> how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR

We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].

We held similarly negative views about the GDPR until Ireland, Czechia, Poland, and Luxembourg accommodated us by hiring our lobbyists as their commissioners.

And this is why every single pan-EU project fails - every major country like the US (previously listed) and China [4][5] cultivated economic and political ties with members that act as vetos in decisions that have a unanimity requirements.

This is why I gave the comparison to the Qing and Mughal Empire - the English, French, and other European nations broke both empires by leveraging one-sided economic deals with subnational units (eg. the Bengal Subah in the Mughal Empire and the unequal treaties in the Qing Empire), which slowly gnawed away at unity.

We in the US, China, Russia, India, and others are starting to do the same to you - not out of explicit strategy, but due to the return of multipolarity and most European state's failure to recover from the Eurozone crisis.

[0] - https://www.ft.com/content/3f67b6ca-7259-4612-8e51-12b497128...

[1] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[2] - https://tvn24.pl/polska/szczyt-w-paryzu-donald-tusk-przed-wy...

[3] - https://www.ft.com/content/616c79ee-34de-425a-865e-e94ba10be...

[4] - http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-11/13/c_1140641.htm

[5] - https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/10/content_WS663d3b83...

sofixa3mo ago

> whenever a joint EU project is formed between two countries with vendors, they inevitabely end up collapsing due to domestic political considerations such as the European MBT and FCAS - no leader wants to be the leader who shut down a factory with 1200 high paying unionized jobs for the greater good

Eurofighter Typhoon and before that the Panavia Tornado. That lineage's next up is the GCAP 6th gen plane.

Horizon/Orizonte and after that the FREMM (which is so good even the US are buying it). In general Italian/French naval cooperation is very strong.

The whole of MBDA and hell even Airbus were created for inter-country cooperation.

There are plenty of successful examples on which to build on, as well as failures from which to learn. But again, today very few military things cannot be sourced from a European supplier. BAE, Leonardo, Dassault, Thales, Rheinmetall, KNDS, Saab, Fincantieri, Naval Group, Indra, Airbus, MBDA etc. are world leaders in their respective fields.

> The reality is, if we the US make a deal with Russia over the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the next 12 months, the EU will have no choice but to accept it if you do not put boots on the ground and if you do not expropriate Russian government assets in the EU

No? US can sign whatever bootlicking deal it wants with Russia, but it's up to Ukraine what happens actually. The EU will continue backing Ukraine. Boots on the ground are highly unlikely, but exploration of Russian assets is quite probable (opposition isn't massive, and as time goes on, will only whither).

> We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].

Cool, nobody cares. The US has put in sufficient actual tariffs that it cannot scream "unfair". EU leaders will try to negotiate whatever they can to lower short term economic damage, but the long term damage is done. The US is not a reliable trade or anything partner, and there's no going back on that.

Regarding your Mughal and Qing comparisons... Damn, where do I even start? EU isn't a country, so the comparison is off from the start.

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0 pointsalephnerd3mo ago0 comments

> There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly

> To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff ... purely a "negotiation tool".

[0] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[1] - https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-...

[2] - https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2025/06/can...

[3] - https://www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-find-grou...

[4] - https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/real-reason...

[5] - https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/ch...

[6] - https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-sets-2...

0 comments

sofixa3mo ago

alephnerdOP3mo ago

> Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent.

> European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.

Not enough for the 1 year time frame needed

> how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR

We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].

We held similarly negative views about the GDPR until Ireland, Czechia, Poland, and Luxembourg accommodated us by hiring our lobbyists as their commissioners.

[0] - https://www.ft.com/content/3f67b6ca-7259-4612-8e51-12b497128...

[1] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[2] - https://tvn24.pl/polska/szczyt-w-paryzu-donald-tusk-przed-wy...

[3] - https://www.ft.com/content/616c79ee-34de-425a-865e-e94ba10be...

[4] - http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-11/13/c_1140641.htm

[5] - https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/10/content_WS663d3b83...

sofixa3mo ago

Eurofighter Typhoon and before that the Panavia Tornado. That lineage's next up is the GCAP 6th gen plane.

Horizon/Orizonte and after that the FREMM (which is so good even the US are buying it). In general Italian/French naval cooperation is very strong.

The whole of MBDA and hell even Airbus were created for inter-country cooperation.

> We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].

Regarding your Mughal and Qing comparisons... Damn, where do I even start? EU isn't a country, so the comparison is off from the start.

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