Agents get a bash-like shell and can only call tools you provide, with constraints you define. No Docker, no subprocess, no SaaS — just pip install amla-sandbox
I'm sad about this bit though:
> Python code is MIT. The WASM binary is proprietary—you can use it with this package but can't extract or redistribute it separately.
[1]: https://github.com/sd2k/eryx/
Any chance you could add SQLite?
% uv run --with pyeryx python
Installed 1 package in 1ms
Python 3.14.0 (main, Oct 7 2025, 16:07:00) [Clang 20.1.4 ] on darwin
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import eryx
>>> sandbox = eryx.Sandbox()
>>> result = sandbox.execute('''
... print("Hello from the sandbox!")
... x = 2 + 2
... print(f"2 + 2 = {x}")
... ''')
>>> result
ExecuteResult(stdout="Hello from the sandbox!\n2 + 2 = 4", duration_ms=6.83, callback_invocations=0, peak_memory_bytes=Some(16384000))
>>> sandbox.execute('''
... import sqlite3
... print(sqlite3.connect(":memory:").execute("select sqlite_version()").fetchall())
... ''').stdout
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<python-input-6>", line 1, in <module>
sandbox.execute('''
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^
import sqlite3
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
print(sqlite3.connect(":memory:").execute("select sqlite_version()").fetchall())
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
''').stdout
^^^^
eryx.ExecutionError: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<string>", line 1, in <module>
File "<string>", line 125, in _eryx_exec
File "<user>", line 2, in <module>
File "/python-stdlib/sqlite3/__init__.py", line 57, in <module>
from sqlite3.dbapi2 import *
File "/python-stdlib/sqlite3/dbapi2.py", line 27, in <module>
from _sqlite3 import *
ModuleNotFoundError: No module named '_sqlite3'
On the licensing: totally fair point. Our intention is to open source the WASM too. The binary is closed for now only because we need to clean up the source code before releasing it as open-source. The Python SDK and capability layer are MIT. We wanted to ship something usable now rather than wait. Since the wasm binary runs in wasmtime within an open source harness, it is possible to audit everything going in and out of the wasm blob for security.
Genuinely open to feedback on this. If the split license is a blocker for your use cases, that's useful signal for us.
uv run --with localsandbox python -c '
from localsandbox import LocalSandbox
with LocalSandbox() as sandbox:
result = sandbox.bash("echo hi")
print(result.stdout)
'
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<string>", line 5, in <module>
result = sandbox.bash("echo hi")
File "/Users/simon/.cache/uv/archive-v0/spFCEHagkq3VTpTyStT-Z/lib/python3.14/site-packages/localsandbox/core.py", line 492, in bash
raise SubprocessCrashed(
...<2 lines>...
)
localsandbox.exceptions.SubprocessCrashed: Node subprocess crashed: error: Failed reading lockfile at '/Users/simon/.cache/uv/archive-v0/spFCEHagkq3VTpTyStT-Z/lib/python3.14/site-packages/localsandbox/shim/deno.lock'
Caused by:
Unsupported lockfile version '5'. Try upgrading Deno or recreating the lockfile
We landed on gvisor in k8s. Our agents run headless Chromium for browser automation, ffmpeg for media processing, yt-dlp, ripgrep, fzf - real tools that would be a nightmare to port or reimplement. Actual Linux with the full ecosystem, solid isolation, no emulation overhead.
Interesting project though - the capability-based tool validation layer seems useful regardless of what's running underneath.
On containers: yes, running in Docker/Firecracker works. The "one prompt injection and you’re done" framing is hyperbolic for containerized setups. The pitch is more relevant for people running agents in their local environment without isolation, or who want something lighter than spinning up containers per execution.
On the licensing: completely valid concern. We are a new company (just two cofounders right now) and the binary is closed for now only because we need to clean up the source code before releasing it as open-source. The Python SDK and capability layer are MIT.
I get that "trust us" isn’t compelling for a security product from an unknown entity, but since the Wasm binary runs within wasmtime (one of the most popular Wasm runtimes) and you can audit everything going in and out of it, the security story should hopefully be more palatable while we work on open sourcing the Wasm core.
The 2025/2026 date discrepancy is just me being sloppy with the license
One nice thing about using AgentFS as the VFS is that it's backed by sqlite so it's very portable - making it easy to fork and resume agent workflows across machines / time.
I really like Amla Sandbox addition of injecting tool calls into the sandbox, which lets the agent generated code interact with the harness provided tools. Very interesting!
While I think that with their current choice for the runtime will hit some limitations (aka: not really full Python support, partial JS support), I strongly believe using Wasm for sandboxing is the way for the future of containers.
At Wasmer we are working hard to make this model work. I'm incredibly happy to see more people joining on the quest!
https://labs.leaningtech.com/blog/browserpod-beta-announceme...
The main issue that I see with Browserpod is very similar to Emscripten: it's designed to work mainly in the browser, and not outside.
In my view, where Wasm really shines, is for enabling containers that work seamlessly in any of this environments: browsers, servers, or even embedded in apps :)
Wasmer is doing great work—we're using wasmtime on the host side currently but have been following your progress. Excited to see WASM sandboxing become more mainstream for this use case.
That's true, but you'll likely need sockets, pydantic or SQLAlchemy (all of of them require heavy support on the Wasm layer!)
Will checkout asterai, thanks for sharing!
I've been working on a couple of things which take a very similar approach, with what seem to be some different tradeoffs:
- eryx [1], which uses a WASI build of CPython to provide a true Python sandbox (similar to componentize-py but supports some form of 'dynamic linking' with either pure Python packages or WASI-compiled native wheels) - conch [2], which embeds the `brush` Rust reimplementation of Bash to provide a similar bash sandbox. This is where I've been struggling with figuring out the best way to do subcommands, right now they just have to be rewritten and compiled in but I'd like to find a way to dynamically link them in similar to the Python package approach...
One other note, WASI's VFS support has been great, I just wish there was more progress on `wasi-tls`, it's tricky to get network access working otherwise...
[1] https://github.com/eryx-org/eryx [2] https://github.com/sd2k/conch
For `jq` specifically we use the excellent `jaq_interpret` crate: https://crates.io/crates/jaq-interpret
curl is interesting. We don't include it currently but we could do it without too much additional effort.
Networking isn't done within the wasm sandbox; we "yield" back to the the caller using what we call "host operations" in order to perform any IO. This keeps the Wasm sandbox minimal and as close to "pure compute" as possible. In fact, the only capabilities we give the WASI runtime is a method to get the current time and to generate random numbers. Since we intercept all external IO, random number generation, time, and the Wasm runtime is just for pure computation, we also get perfect reproducibility. We can replay anything within the sandbox exactly.
Your approach with brush is interesting. Having actual bash semantics rather than "bash-like" is a real advantage for complex scripts. The dynamic linking problem for subcommands is a tough one; have you looked at WASI components for this? Feels like that's where it'll eventually land but the tooling isn't there yet.
Will check out eryx and conch. Thanks for sharing!
I did something very similar to you for networking in eryx too (no networking in conch yet); defined an `eryx:net` interface in WIT and reimplemented the `urllib` module using host networking, which most downstream packages (httpx, requests, etc) use far enough down the stack. It's a tradeoff but I think it's pretty much good enough for most use cases like this, and gives the host full control which is great.
Oh full transparency, the vast majority of conch and eryx were written by Opus 4.5. Being backed by wasmtime and the rather strict Rust compiler is definitely a boon here!
> Security model
> The sandbox runs inside WebAssembly with WASI for a minimal syscall interface. WASM provides memory isolation by design—linear memory is bounds-checked, and there's no way to escape to the host address space. The wasmtime runtime we use is built with defense-in-depth and has been formally verified for memory safety.
> On top of WASM isolation, every tool call goes through capability validation: [...]
> The design draws from capability-based security as implemented in systems like seL4—access is explicitly granted, not implicitly available. Agents don't get ambient authority just because they're running in your process.
>> How to run vscode-container-wasm-gcc-example with c2w, with joelseverin/linux-wasm?
> linux-wasm is apparently faster than c2w.
container2wasm issue #550: https://github.com/container2wasm/container2wasm/issues/550#...
vscode-container-wasm-gcc-example : https://github.com/ktock/vscode-container-wasm-gcc-example
Cloudflare Runners also run WASM; with workerd:
cloudflare/workerd : https://github.com/cloudflare/workerd
...
"Cage" implements ARM64 MTE Memory Tagging Extensions support for WASM with LLVM emscripten iirc:
- "Cage: Hardware-Accelerated Safe WebAssembly" (2024) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46151170 :
> [ llvm-memsafe-wasm , wasmtime-mte , ]
We differentiate from agentvm by being lightweight (~11 MB Wasm binary, compared to 173 MB for agentvm). Though there is still a lot we can learn from agentvm, thank you for sharing their project.
We are currently also building a solution InstaVM which is ideologically the same but for cloud https://instavm.io
Would love to see your MCP approach if you've published it anywhere.
So no local models are supported.
Some advantages of building the sandbox in wasm, aside from the security benefits, are complete execution reproducibility. amla-sandbox controls all external side effects, leaving the wasm core as just "pure computation", which makes recording traces and replaying them very easy. It's great for debugging complex workflows.
WASM has:
- Bounds checked linear memory
- No system calls except what you explicitly grant via WASI
- Much smaller attack surface
VMs have:
- Hardware isolation, separate kernel
- May have hypervisor bugs leading to VM escape (rare in practice though)
Some problems with containers:
- Shared host kernel (kernel exploit = escape)
- Seccomp/AppArmor/namespaces reduce attack surface but don't eliminate it
- Larger attack surface (full syscall interface)
- Container escapes are a known class of vulnerability