TLS is not The Web
Does the TLS working group know that? Pretty much all their design work apart from one guy representing email use via Postfix and a few guys working on a perpetual-motion-machine profile for telcos assumes the only possible use for TLS is the web.Personally, I think we have a bigger problem on the PKI side, where Web PKI is very strong, but Internet PKI has been neglected. The recent move to remove client authentication is a good example.
PKI as it stands is only a few steps from Google just deciding everyone must have a short-lived certificate from Google to be on the web.
The root programs who have their own CAs are also cloud providers, who arguably have a legitimate need for the CA. Or in Apple's case they have their own CA, but don't issue externally. They keep CA and root program separate.
If you don’t like a particular CA’s policies, you can choose a different one.
The reduction of TLS cert lifetime to a max of 398 days was an Apple policy.
You can now make any web server operate with a publicly valid TLS certificate without paying any money, registering a domain, configuring DNS or disclosing any personally identifiable information. It can be entirely automatic and zero configuration. The only additional service required is something like a STUN server so the public IP can be discovered and updated over time.
He is hosting his domain on a machine behind a reverse proxy over which he has no control (common enough); in this case the server will not know its own public IP as all resolves to (for example) `www.mydomain.com` will return the address of the proxy. To get the public IP he uses a STUN (or similar) public-facing service.
Not quite sure why he needs the public IP, though: from what I remember, the certs include the domain, not the IP.