this was kind of inevitable once prediction markets got large enough. when traders have millions in open positions on geopolitical events, they have direct financial incentive to suppress or promote specific narratives. same dynamic as short sellers attacking companies, but applied to real-world events instead of stocks. the whole prediction market thesis assumes information flows freely into prices — breaks down when participants start trying to influence the information itself
> the whole prediction market thesis assumes information flows freely into prices — breaks down when participants start trying to influence the information itself
lol fair enough, naive is a strong word but yeah i get your point. i didnt mean nobody tries to manipulate markets — obviously they do. my point was more that the original thesis behind prediction markets assumed this would be a minor problem because the financial incentive to correct misinformation would outweigh the incentive to create it. turns out thats not always true when you can make more money threatening a journalist than trading the actual contract
I think it is much stronger than that: I think the whole reason these exist is to create a way for parties to profit off insider information that side-steps the stock market. Any other effects are a happy coincidence.
