Iran as example: Iran is ~5x larger than Iraq by most metrics, US generated ~5x more sorties in Iraq than Iran (with more carriers and regional basing). Factor in hits on Iraq was with 10% precise munitions, Iran has 100%, but Iran doctrine also designed to tank hits by forcing US to expend more munitions etc... rough napkin match suggests mathematically unlikely for US to damage Iran on same scale vs Iraq given Iran's size, US+co sortie #s and air campaign time frame.
Then see initial claims that 100% of Iran regional strike complex destroyed, but Iran obviously still hitting regional targets at XYZ rate (online trackers etc) and you get better sense of picture. News of ~50% of US forward basing hit, enablers like AWACS or radars hit that will further reduce US efficiency, carrier moved from 500km to 1000km standoff, losing airframes flying over Iran, and it's clear Iran maintains ability to fire back, and what they can hit is effectively forcing US to adopt more conservative tactics to stay outside of Iranian fires. Which translates to even less efficiency - less strike sorties (more tanking) and more highend munitions (to reduce risk). Integrate relevant stats as they become available - CSIS report on ~50% of high end stand off, ~50% of high end interceptors expended and numbers suggest US can not mathematically sustain air campaign tempo which has reached marginal effect in terms of suppressing Iranian ability to fire back without unsustainably burning through high end munition stockpiles for much longer before complete strategic insolvency (US cannot fight peer war without these munitions). It all comports to US air campaign cannot defang Iran militarily, even if it might, continuing would be Pyrrhic, then all the talk about blowing up Iranian civilian infra, doing counter blockade to conserve munitions, moving to negotiations suddenly makes sense.
>i dont think China has leverage
In terms of immediate leverage ~90% of highend semi production and/or semi supply chain, reminder many, many, sole source semi suppliers feeding TSMC Arizona / US fabs from east Asia. Arguably bespoke semi supply chain is currently MORE vulnerable, i.e. less redundant than global oil which have many geographic sources.
In terms of blockade, draw a 5000km circle around PRC. That is PRC IRBM / Antiship range covers Malacca, Hormuz, Aden, aka all critical energy SLOCs. PRC have demonstrate coordinated hypersonic antiship missile strike on moving target at sea, with sufficient space ISR to track US shipping in these regions + PRC industrial base = PRC has magnitude greater potential than Iran to degrade US in much broader geographic theaters, and not just land basing but actively deployed navy, i.e. US not capable of blocking Malacca for long because PRC IRBMs can (at least according to demonstrations) take out US ships, their replenishment fleet or the basing that tops up the replenishment fleet... every piece of logistic chain that sustains USN is exquisitely vulnerable to PRC fires. Ditto with USAF tanking/sustainment/logistics.
In terms of REAL PRC leverage, Draw a 8000km circle, this reaches CONUS - 2025 DoD/W China report finally acknowledges PRC has ability conventionally strike west coast. Note earlier disclaimer that important to filter motivations, i.e. these capabilities have existed for years, it was only acknowledged in 2025. Now ask if PRC can make their 10000km+ missiles conventional, then simple geography math will inform that will reach Texas... that's PADD3, i.e. most of US oil strategic production. That's PRC actual leverage to US blockade (legally act of war) - escalating to reciprocal energy disruption on CONUS. US blockade was only viable strategy if damage unilateral/lowcost (i.e. PRC 10-15 years ago / Iran now). Current consequence with respect to PRC is PRC has option to reciprocally degrade CONUS energy extraction/refining at source for mutual disruption. All signs point to PRC skipping US model of CSGs, B21s for rocket based conventional global strike. Hence game theory behind blockade is broken. I surmise will take a few more years before DoD China report acknowledges broader CONUS vulnerability, and once PRC's CONUS level leverage is treated as baseline, a lot of strategic calculations / narratives will have to shift.
