In some cases, maybe you need to allow permanently git to open outbound resquests to github.com (or gitlab, etc), but at least in my case, I'm okey allowing these connections manually.
> preinstall script: bun run index.js
> Dual exfiltration: > stolen data is committed as Git objects to public GitHub repositories (api.github.com) > and sent as RSA+AES encrypted HTTPS POSTs to hxxps://t.m-kosche[.]com/api/public/otel/v1/traces (disguised as OpenTelemetry traces)
> The Bun installer command (command -v bun >/dev/null 2>&1 || (curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export PATH=$HOME/.bun/bin:$PATH)) prepends every injected hook to guarantee Bun availability
> A separate gh-token-monitor daemon (decrypted from J7, deployed by class so) installs to ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh with its own systemd service and LaunchAgent. It polls stolen GitHub tokens at 60-second intervals with a 24-hour TTL
This attack in particular would have caused OpenSnitch to go crazy, giving you the opportunity to review what's going on.
Yep, exactly. Reject by default, with reasonably judicious always-allow rules.
from one step process, this will become universally usable two step process
But for the time being, the common entry vector is clear:
https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch/discussions/1119
> 2) trigger a tab open to attacker's website
be sure not to use extra cli parameters like "firefox --new-tab <url>", because if the rule is filtering by process path + cmdline it'll trigger a pop-up to allow the outbound request.
Still doesn’t negate the value of OpenSwitch, since the majority of malware won’t do that. But really good to keep in mind.
Correct in general that it doesn't protect against stuff like that. But this whitelisting is done per-command (in this case, the whitelisting is scoped to the node executable). I've had no need to allow node access to Git in the first place, so no problem there.
> Unless you have to accept every time an app posts or requests data from known hosts?
OpenSnitch doesn't have access to application-level information, so it has no concept of "post" or "request." It's got DNS names, layer 3 info, layer 4 info, and other such things that are visible to the kernel. Your rules get matched to network traffic based on these various properties.
