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0 pointsantonvs6d ago0 comments

This organization is using AWS apparently. They would store the root account credentials in AWS Secret Manager. That costs $0.40 per month. People in the relevant admin group would have access to them. They would log in with their individual AWS credentials in order to access the root credentials if they need that.

But, requiring AWS root credentials itself is an anti-pattern and implies an immature organization. That should not be needed for day-to-day operation.

This is all just ignorance and incompetence, nothing more.

> Lastly IT teams in large corporations being secure is a myth for most part.

This is CISA. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for the United States. Security is what they're supposed to specialize in.

The only potential excuse here is that DOGE gutted them to a point that has completely compromised their capabilities. However, this situation is bad enough that it suggests that problems predated that incident.

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sandeepkd6d ago

To be honest I do not know how to respond to this, cause this plays out quite often this way and sounds pretty convincing on surface. Unfortunately this is the gap between theory and implementation. There is a reason why the ROOT credentials are called ROOT. In case of anything going wrong, all your regular user accounts would be locked, see how you lock yourself out of this circular dependency. ONE SHOULD NEVER NOT PUT THEIR ROOT CREDENTIALS IN THE SECRET MANAGER OF SAME ACCOUNT. Its a classical circular problem, compilers compiler type. For AWS itself they have this additional concept of management account that allows you to defer this problem to just one more level.

Bottomline, you can have any number of boxes to lock other boxes and put their key to bounding box, ultimately there would be one outermost box that is locked by key which is not in any box

antonvsOP5d ago

> In case of anything going wrong, all your regular user accounts would be locked

You're talking about a very specific and rare scenario, and certainly not something that justifies storing all your passwords in plaintext in a CSV file.

In almost all scenarios where you would need root credentials, having them in the provider's secret manager is fine.

Obviously you need to store root credentials outside of the secret manager as well, but that should be a "break glass" scenario that's only used in emergencies. And you don't store them in plaintext CSV.

> Unfortunately this is the gap between theory and implementation.

I don't disagree that there are many, many organizations that practice bad security. But that doesn't mean there are none that have good security. And one would expect CISA to have good security, otherwise there's really no point in its existence.

There's a difference between saying "this is what most organizations are like" and "this is the way it has to be". The former is true, the latter is false.

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