Similarly, I could see ransomware groups hacking in and feeling bad for GH so they improve a few things to help them get to at leave nine fives of uptime.
If catch a burglar in my house, I will ask them what they are doing. If they respond with "I'm searching for money!", I'll suggest "Let's search together, and whatever we find, we split 50/50"
Do that automatically for all code downloaded from the web and run outside a sandbox.
Maybe won't catch everything, but should catch most evil stuff, especially if a variety of models and prompts are used.
Why is the answer for Javascript developers "don't use leftpad" but for the AI crew it's "convert the source code to tokens and attempt to strip out the bad stuff without breaking the rest"?
b) You can have the LLM use separate sub agents for different files/ code.
c) You can have the LLM do analysis using grep and other deterministic tools ex: "use grep to find 'unsafe' calls"
You can set this to only allow plugins from Microsoft, which is a company most people trust and also owns Github.
Oh wait...
I don't even know what the plugin upgrade command is, and I don't plan to find out. Recommended.
Nothing is safe.
The only way I found out is because I run NixOS and it downloaded a dynamically linked binary that failed to start up and it spat out an error
No shade on Zed, sometimes in-house security tools just don't like new software.
That sounds pretty specific.
Zed was super impressive when I first started it, but I don't know yet how it compares with PHP Storm.
It wont be the same experience at all, the debugging and deployment stuff will be strictly inferior and the jump to code might be less impressive.
Zed has LSP support though, so if you have a good LSP then you’ll get some nice IDE features, but they’re not really comparable.
Plus, it runs like shit on Linux.
Browser extensions have been a great playground for me.
https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-...
This isn't the first time their plugin has led to RCE...
That kind of thing might be a case to not publicly disclose..
With this level of availability, would company remain on cloud?
This is going to create so much work and job security for software developers.
Large companies are going to have to adopt all kinds of policies and bureaucratic processes to protect themselves from supply chain attacks. It's going to increase the amount of engineering work, create new blockers, increase the on-boarding time for new tech talent. I suspect that software devs are going to get their jobs back with a thick, cushiony layer of bureaucracy on top.
Software developers are a bit like lawyers. As an aggregate, they have the capacity to create problems which translate directly into billable hours for themselves.
There is no security risk that you could use to convince me that ”devs should only have access to code they need to modify”.
It’s a simple rule from a simpler time, to limit the risk of total compromise.
I think it’s actually non-trivial to determine how many repos you should have read-only access to. I frequently hop through multiple repos that I don’t contribute to, just to understand how the system is architected and what it does at different stages. We even have an internal Claude skill for finding relevant repo for a given problem which relies on personal gh access (via CLI). It _can_ be done more securely but those defaults built over many years will take time to change.
The real question is why github has 3800 internal repos.
Robot source code; satellite ground station hardware; satellite ground station software; visualization; satellite hardware; satellite software; nuttx + its submodules for 2 different projects; linux kernel fork; circuitpython fork; raspberry pico tools fork; embedded programming/debugging tools; my lecture notes; my automated grading tooling; etc etc etc. That's just me + ~35 students in classes.
Pretty easy to see how when you have scale you can get to a few thousand.
*assuming github dogfoods github
But did he clone all the repos into his machine? I doubt it. So, the hacker extracted all the 3800 repos using the employee's machine as a gateway? I doubt it as well, I'm sure they would have detected this huge amount of data much earlier than transferring all of it?
> The real question is why github has 3800 internal repos.
I guess they mean customer's private repos?
I can think of _one_ product that allows you to set up low-friction access management, and AFAIK most users of that product don't set it up that way.
Software engineers _should_ be able to request access to dev resources JIT during their day-to-day work, have that access auto-approve in >99% of cases, have it auto-expire if they don't actually use the resources, and have all of that be subject to anomaly detection/approval escalations and other auditing.
Instead in most orgs it's like fill out a form, get your manager (who's always in meetings) to approve and then wait some number of days for a human to click-ops your request. At best you can open a PR and have the changes applied in an hour or two.
You _should_ be able to get access to things pretty much immediately if you need them and they're not sensitive. Then we could deny by default without cratering productivity.
Tell them to make a better UX and they lose their minds in a huffy puff of fake crisis mode or get avoidant with stonewalling 'secret security stuff' that you can't hold them to account for. Or eat 50% of developer machine performance for "endpoint security" and the carnival of sadness goes on and on.
Signal is an example of security as a product that was actually designed for user UX in mind to give one example.
I’ve ridden startups through the phase where they transition to “responsible adults”, and start putting in policies and locking things down and generally behaving like the giant corporations they expect to be one day (and that the locker downers came from and are used to).
You can feel the deceleration, like taking your foot off the gas on the freeway. I’ve sat through all hands meetings where the ceo asked why we don’t ship as fast anymore, and since by that time most of the fast moving folk have moved on, nobody has an explanation.