>If Senator Wyden says that something's unconstitutional and that is why he's voting the way he is, say, on the Senate Intel Committee, fine, but the courts and the Executive branch won't honor that yet. Or, for something hypothetical, the Senate could pass a resolution that the Patriot Act was unconstitutional, and then people would be surprised but otherwise nothing would have changed.

I don't see how that's different than it is for the courts. If Justice Scalia writes a book describing his theory of constitutional interpretation and how he thinks specific cases should have come out, that doesn't mean anything the same as an individual Senator's speech or a Congressional resolution doesn't mean anything.

>Also, Congress could repeal the Patriot Act, saying it was unconstitutional, on Monday and enact it again on Tuesday without mentioning constitutionality and give any reasons they want or no reasons.

So can the Supreme Court. For example, Plessy v. Ferguson has since been overruled. Conversely, the modern interpretation of the commerce clause is a lot broader than it was prior to the New Deal. Granted the court is supposed to give a reason, but they don't actually have to, and in many cases the "reason" is just that they now disagree with the previous precedent (and the real reason is often that different people are now on the Court).

>Or, I can say something's unconstitutional and so can you and so can anyone, but when the Supreme Court says so, it really sticks. To me, this is a difference in kind.

I don't see how you're distinguishing this from when Congress "says so" by enacting legislation or the president "says so" through an executive order. Obviously they have to do so in their official capacity and (for Congress) have a majority in agreement, but so does the court.