(This bit of pure-mathematics wonkery ignores the substance of jarrett's question, though; one doesn't need the full Gödelian power to observe that a priori theorems that must be verified at compile time can never account for data that are provided only after compilation.)
I'm not sure I agree with "theorems that must be verified at compile time can never account for data that are provided only after compilation". At compile time, you prove the assertion "for every x, the program outputs correct answer for x". Now, you don't know that the user will enter say x=5 at runtime, but since you proved a theorem about _every_ x, this includes x=5. You cannot predict the future (the path that will be taken by the program), but once you prepare for all possible futures, you're safe.
I hear Idris is more reasonable in this regard and has better general purpose programming properties.
You can say the same for any strongly typed language, but reality is it's the opposite. If your program has a good design, it's easy to refactor.
It seems to me they could. Suppose my program depends on external input D. That input could be a file it loads, keyboard input, network input, or anything else. Could I declare that I expect D to have properties P? And then, could the language force me to implement a code path for cases where D does not satisfy P? An example of such a code path would be to print an error message and then terminate the program.
They don't prove theorems. You do this by writing a program.
Or do these unprovable-but-true facts mostly elude them, since they are operating in a formal system that 'hides' them?
The most common is the Axiom of Choice, which if true is incredibly convenient. For example, the Axiom of Choice implies that all Vector Spaces have a basis, which makes linear algebra tractable. Mathematicians generally accept it as true because it's useful and intuitively true, but it does have some consequences that are intuitively false, like the Banach-Tarski paradox. We even have a saying: "The Axiom of Choice is obviously true, the Well-Ordering Principle is obviously false, and Zorn's Lemma no one even knows." The implicit punchline being, these three things are logically equivalent because each implies the other.
Other axioms that are independent of ZF include the Continuum Hypothesis and the Axiom of Foundation. The Continuum Hypothesis says that there is no type of infinity that is larger than the cardinality of the Rationals and also smaller than the cardinality of the Reals. It doesn't make a damn lick of sense for such a type of infinity to exist, but it's not technically possible to disprove it. The Axiom of Foundation, in very simple terms, disallows objects like "the set that contains itself." Such sets are not constructable in ZF, and are logically impossible, but they are not technically disallowed.
Using "stronger" axiom sets to investigate the properties and consequences of these unprovable statements is common. Additionally, many automated theorem-provers include several of the more convenient axioms that aren't included in "regular" mathematics.
More reading: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_statements_undecidable_...
(Note: ZFC is ZF plus the Axiom of Choice; Choice is so damn convenient that the mathematics establishment usually accepts it by default, although proving that you don't need Choice to prove something is often seen as a worthwhile accomplishment.)
But the Godel's incompleteness theorem states that for all system that includes (Peano's) arithmetic, one can find a formula in this system that has cannot be proved and whose contrary cannot be proved either. And to answer your question, Godel's proof explicitly shows such a formula.
A more model-theoretic approach says that a formula is true in a theory (not a system, although the word choice doesn't matter) if it is true in all models of that theory—a statement that can (in principle) be concretely verified simply by testing in each such model. Then it may (and will) be true that a statement is true in "all possible worlds", but that there is no way of proving it from the rules that constrain 'possibility'.
