> The assigned IPv6 address incorporates media access control (MAC) address information from the network interface and may allow for host identification via interface ID, network interface card, or host vendor.
How long has it been since NSA has looked at generally-available OSs with IPv6 support? IPv6 "Privacy Addresses" are a thing that's on-by-default everywhere (and a damn thorn in my side). SLAAC has been using a identifier that's a combination of a randomly-generated ID and the subnet that the address is being generated for rather than the MAC address of the NIC for address generation for ages. (This is yet another thing that I revert back to the old behavior.)
They go on to recommend disabling SLAAC and using only DHCPv6. Does NSA know something exploitable about common DHCPv6 implementations that we don't? ;)
> ...a dual stack DNS implementation may need to support both A and AAAA records.
It's weird to say "dual stack DNS implementation". DNS servers can store A and AAAA records, regardless of whether their host is doing "dual stack" addressing or not. (If yours cannot, then by golly, you fucked up when you wrote your DNS server.)
This is what they say
> NSA recommends assigning addresses to hosts via a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6) server to mitigate the SLAAC privacy issue. Alternatively, this issue can also be mitigated by using a randomly generated interface ID (RFC 4941 – Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Auto-configuration in IPv6) [1] that changes over time, making it difficult to correlate activity while still allowing network defenders requisite visibility
> A solution to this are IPv6 privacy extensions (which Debian enables by default if IPv6 connectivity is detected during initial installation), which will assign an additional randomly generated address to the interface, periodically change them and prefer them for outgoing connections. Incoming connections can still use the address generated by SLAAC.
* https://debian-handbook.info/browse/stable/sect.ipv6.html
* https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/ifupdown/interfaces.5.e...
>At least 20% of IP-enabled assets on Federal networks are IPv6-only by the end of FY 2023;9 >b. At least 50% of IP-enabled assets on Federal networks are IPv6-only by the end of FY 2024; >c. At least 80% of IP-enabled assets on Federal networks are IPv6-only by the end of FY 2025
https://www.cio.gov/assets/resources/internet-protocol-versi...
I'm making the assumption here that anyone concerned about their network attack surface is actively capturing network or netflow data in which tools like openargus[1] or Arkime[2] make all of this collectable/searchable. Additionally most network devices support mirror/monitoring to offload data if you aren't working on the scale of needed dedicated taps/aggregators.
However, if this guidance is trying to influence government office routers and internet gateways... It's a different story.
A transition from IPV4 to IPV6 creates a new per device tracking capability that leaks internal network structure. This in my opinion is worse than internal domains getting certs from Let's Encrypt https://crt.sh/?q=twitter.com cr: https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2022/01/should-you-use-lets-encrypt...
The dual stack, DHCP and SLAAC can go a long way in adding some anonymity.
Ipv4 security guidelines do not look much different.
TLdr: be aware of the differences and prefer ipv6-only instead of dual stack if you can, to reduce complexity.
Let's be very honest here, does anyone have a good reasom to believe another 25 years would mean ipv6 would displace ipv4 or even solve the address shortage when cgnat and other workarounds are profitable to network vendors?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost_fallacy -----
My controversial solution is to stop using numbers for addressing on layer3. A new IP protocol should have hierarchial domain name addressimg. So google.com would have .com as the top domain you would have routes for each TLD with non-ISPs default routing tlds like .com, ISP networks would resolve the route for .google under the .com routing table and so on. Upper layers would be oblivious except that you have less code now. On LANs you can create whatever domain hierachy works for you so long as the TLD is part of a predefined list. TLDs will have a fixed maximum length of 128bits for routing performance amd such. PKI/TLS would work just fine except now you have an extra layer of security in that ISP routing tables would have to also route to the wrong AS and can implement source route (customer1244.telecast.isp) validation to make mitm only slightly harder and address spoofing ddos impossible. So forget about numbers, ascii is also numbers. You are already doing this with v6 and 2600:: and other prefixes. As for layer3 translation, I have an even more controversial idea that will also solve wifi security and lan based mitms for good but for another comment.
While this is true World IPv6 Launch Day in 2012 is the date most people point to for earnest IPv6 deployments. It was also not completely ratified until 2017.
> At what point or threshold should there be a proposal for a simple address length extension of IPv4.
If you pass a IPv4v2 packet it will not be routed. You'll need to replace all networking equipment to support IPv4v2...which is what we've done/currently doing w.r.t. IPv6. The engineers who wrote the spec were very much aware of how much "we've got one shot at this" was.
> another 25 years would mean ipv6 would displace ipv4
We're at over 50% deployment in the US. Again, it's closer to 10 years.
I was shocked to see that as soon as your ISP switched to IPV6, your host is now directly addressed. As a by product of skipping NAT you are now relying on every machine having proper firewall settings. [UPDATE: or the router drops incoming IPV6 connections w/ it's firewall]
Just think about how many windows machines out there have Remote desktop enabled but were only safe because they were not publicly accessible or the hospital machines that are still running windows XP. God help us.
When my ISP started handing out IPv6 addresses, my Asus RT-AC68U by default blocked incoming IPv6 connections unless they were replies to previous outgoing connections.
That is to say: stateful firewalls exist in the IPv6 world just like they do in the IPv4 work.
Just because your laptop or desktop gets a globally routable address does not mean that anyone can hit it.
I had a nighthawk, I ended up setting up the ipv6 rules.
The TLDR on the debate so far is if router shipped over the last 20 years have both drop IPV4 and drop IPV6 incoming.
In my opinion, NAT was an added layer on top of firewall rules because inbound ports had to be mapped to a particular host and port since the router would not know which host to send to. This created a default opt out experience because for a port on your machine to get accessed, a packet must pass inbound rules and match a port map table entry.
For one thing, a /64 issued to a house is a pretty daunting search space for the scanning worms of yesterday.
Another, computers today do come with firewalls that are enabled by default and tricky to disable.
Third, the industry really had to start taking memory safety and attack surface seriously after the Blaster/Sasser/MyDoom days. We see another article here on HN every week about another company categorically solving memory problems by adopting Rust.
Finally, having remote desktop shouldn't be a problem if people don't know your password, no? It's not like there is a firewall stopping baddies from guessing your Gmail password.
I realize that a NAT/PAT device does incidentally serve as a stateful firewall for many homes, but I think it is less important with modern OS's than one might think.
Now for the hospitals still using Windows XP...yeah you're right about that. I'd like to see regulators start fining companies for using obsolete hardware and software.
Eh...
-----
We have outlined a number of techniques that scanning worms can use in an IPv6 Internet to locate potential targets. These techniques are equally applicable to the current IPv4 Internet, albeit not as efficient as random scanning. Although “conventional” address-space scanning is prohibitively expensive in that environment, we believe that the diversity of sources we discussed (which is by no means exhaustive) guarantees a rich target set for worms.
---
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/v6worms.pdf
A lot of them do rely on getting that first host infected though, but that's not exactly dissimilar to IPv4 networks as well.
>Finally, having remote desktop shouldn't be a problem if people don't know your password, no? It's not like there is a firewall stopping baddies from guessing your Gmail password.
That actually begs an interesting point. IPv4 allows for services to block use IP profiling to limit an attacker's attempts to brute-force / semi-brute-force a password or other attacks like a DDoS. What would be IT / Security processionals response when an attacker can just jump to another IPv6 address and resume the attack?
/64? You should be getting at least a /56
Some math to illustrate this:
* IPv4 has 2^32 addresses
* 2^32 ≈ 4 billion
* in mathematics, a^x = a^(y+z) = a^y * a^z
* so: 2^64 = 2^32 * 2^32
* therefore: 2^64 = four billion IPv4 Internets
One IPv6 subnet can fit many, many entire IPv4 Internets.
Your attack surface is primarily your firewall which admittedly might be an easy target - but not as easy as an unprotected Windows box.
IPv6 is a step in the right direction, but the resolution to security issues can't be more firewalls or more network equipment. It has to start with operating systems. It is completely ridiculous that applications have access to the network and most of the filesystem by default. Operating systems need to give limited access to the filesystem and other services so that a compromised service isn't a big deal. A successful attacker doesn't own the whole system. They owned a poorly written application and the small sandbox that it's in. This is an obvious idea to most engineers, but neither windows nor macOS get this right out of the box. The iPhone's sandboxing model and fine-grained permissions are way ahead here, but there is still more improvement to be had.
And then there's the issue of most applications not requiring network access in the first place. There is no reason for Word, Photoshop, Blender, etc. to ever need access to the network. A firewall that only administrators can manipulate is also not a solution, that has to be in the users hands as well. Reasoning about a global table of rules is the wrong UX.
match out on em2 inet from ! em2 to any nat-to em2
block in on em2 inet6 from any to any
On the side of hospitals I would think most IPv6 allowances would at a minimum be managed on the edge firewalls which would be a separate device than the ISP's hand-off, host based firewalls aren't a requirement. An assumption on my part but I would doubt for those transit connections the upstream is just "turning" IPv6 on without some co-ordination. Admittedly, I don't know a lot about how hospital networks are run but i'd imagine some MSP involvement for smaller locations, possibly.
This paragraph from RFC7934 really sums it up much better than I can:
> Indeed, it could be argued that the main reason for deploying IPv6, instead of continuing to scale the Internet using only IPv4 and large-scale NAT44, is because doing so can provide all the hosts on the planet with end-to-end connectivity that is constrained not by accidental technical limitations, but only by intentional security policies.
most of those routers are very, very dumb.
do the following excercise. add your routers external address as a gateway for your net internal IP, now from the outside reach your computer. easy. fully standards compliant. pierce your NAT like it wasn't even there.