Can you point me to some documentation that would give me cause to believe otherwise?
This is what happens when you mount a TrueCrypt volume using their GUI application in linux.
1. A TrueCrypt volume is unlocked by TrueCrypt.
2. The unlocked volume is mounted by TrueCrypt.
The mounting "script" in this case is TrueCrypt and hence it is TrueCrypt's fault.
If you unlock the volume using TrueCrypt and then mount the unlocked volume using udisks,then it would be udisks' fault.
If you unlock the volume using TrueCrypt and then mount the volume yourself,then it will be your fault.
The fault is in the person who is doing the mounting and in TrueCrypt's GUI application case,TrueCrypt is the one who is doing the mounting and hence its TrueCrypt's fault.
How are you using TrueCrypt GUI if TrueCrypt is not the part that does the mounting?
I am not aware of any documentations but i am aware of discussions around "best practices" when it comes to usage of the mount command.
There's a GUI? Huh. Then, then answer to your question is "I'm not using the TrueCrypt GUI.".
This documentation is pretty representative of what I've been seeing (and what has worked for me) when I've looked in to using TrueCrypt on Linux:
http://www.gentoo-wiki.info/TrueCrypt
> The mounting "script" in this case is TrueCrypt and hence it is TrueCrypt's fault.
I was completely unaware of the existence of a TrueCrypt GUI. I understood TrueCrypt to be the block device encryption software that filled the same role as LUKS.
So, you should refine your claim. Rather than saying "TrueCrypt mounts things insecurely." say "There are helper scripts distributed with TrueCrypt that mount things insecurely. They should be fixed.".
> I am aware of discussions around "best practices" when it comes to usage of the mount command.
The thing about Best Practices is that they don't work in all circumstances. If the volume mounting scripts packaged with TrueCrypt get updated, any defaults should be configurable, as there exist folks who need suid binaries in their TC volumes, as well as folks who don't like mounting things in /run . :)
[root@mtz zc]# truecrypt ./rrr.img ../ink -p xxx
[root@mtz zc]#
So i opened it from the command line,i looked at the mounted volume and it was also mounted without "nosuid" option and hence the same problematic behavior is there even when TrueCrypt is used from the terminal.
Even when using the CLI component,TrueCrypt automatically does the mounting and hence its TrueCrypt's fault.
The mounting part is not done by a third party script that just happen to be bundled with TrueCrypt,it is done as a core part of TrueCrypt.The "mount" command is set here[1] and executed here[2]. You can walk up the code path to see where the "nosuid" options should have been set but isnt.
Its kind of hard to follow discussions here so if you want to take this further then respond to my email address at mhogomchungu at Gmail Dot com
[1] https://github.com/CipherShed/CipherShed/blob/e8529e95d89d3f...
[2] https://github.com/CipherShed/CipherShed/blob/e8529e95d89d3f...
ps: ciphershed is a TrueCrypt fork.You can look up TrueCrypt's original source code if you dont trust the link i gave as i couldnt find easily taggable TrueCrypt source code online
To be clear, it would be a serious coup if this happened in TrueCrypt itself. The developers have made it very clear that TrueCrypt is now an abandoned project. They've expressed a preference that no one fork it, but there will almost certainly be a "pseudo-fork" programmed using TC as reference code.
I suppose it's fine to use "Updating TrueCrypt" as a sort of shorthand for "change this in the pseudo-fork", I just wanted to make it clear that during the gap between TrueCrypt and whatever its successor will be, it's best to focus on mitigation strategies for vulnerabilities.
